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Abstract 
Sponsored search advertising, where search providers allow advertisers to participate in a real-
time auction and compete for ad slots on search engine results pages (SERPs), is currently one of 
the most popular advertising channels by marketers. Some domains such as Amazon.com allocate 
in millions of dollars a month to their sponsored search campaigns. Considering the amount of 
money allocated to sponsored search as well as the dynamic nature of keyword advertising process, 
the campaign budget planning decision is a non-trivial task for advertisers. Budget constrained 
advertisers must consider a number of factors when deciding how to organize campaigns, how 
much budget to allocate to them, and which keywords to bid on. Specifically, they must decide 
how to spend budget across planning horizons, markets, campaigns, and ad groups. In this thesis, 
I develop a simulation model that integrates the issues of keyword segmentation, campaign 
organization, and budget allocation in order to characterize different budget allocation strategies 
and understand their implications on search advertising performance. Using the buying funnel 
model as the basis of keyword segmentation and campaign organization, I examine several budget 
allocation strategies (i.e., search Volume-based, Cost-based, and Clicks-based) and evaluate their 
performance implications for firms that may pursue different marketing objectives based on 
industry and or product/service offerings. I evaluate the simulation model using four fortune 500 
companies as cases and their keyword advertising data obtained from Spyfu.com. The results and 
statistical analysis shows significant improvements in budget utilization using the above-
mentioned allocation strategies over a Baseline strategy commonly used in practice. The study 
offers a unique insight into the budget allocation problem in sponsored search advertising by 
leveraging a theoretical framework for keyword segmentation, campaign management, and 
performance evaluation. It also provides insights for advertiser on operational issues such as 
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keyword categorization and campaign organization and prioritization for improved performance. 
The proposed simulation model also contributes a valid experimental environment to test further 
decision scenarios, theoretical frameworks, and campaign allocation strategies in sponsored search 
advertising. 
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  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The Internet has created many opportunities for advertisers to easily attract and retain customers. 
Internet advertising revenue now exceeds that of traditional advertising channels such as cable, 
broadcast television, and print media with $42.8 billion in 2013 (IAB, 2014). While the combined 
revenue of $74.5 billion for both cable and broadcast television exceeds that of Internet 
advertising, the growth in revenue for the Internet is far outpacing that of television with 17 percent 
and 3.3 percent, respectively (IAB, 2013; IAB, 2014). There is an abundance of information on 
the Internet today, and the volume can be overwhelming for users. Search engine providers such 
as Google and Yahoo! have gone to great lengths to reduce the burden of finding relevant 
information by offering their Web indexing services (search engines). These services actively 
crawl the Web and index sites providing users with the ability to input queries, and in return obtain 
relevant results (images, video, website listings, etc.) from the search engines. In doing so, the 
search engines simplify the process of locating the relevant information that the user is looking 
for. As of July 2015, the top three search providers, Google, Microsoft Bing, and Yahoo! each 
account for 88.4%, 4.1%, and 3.7%  of search engine traffic, respectively (Statista, 2014). 
Search providers deliver these services to Internet users free of charge. However, they have 
created mechanisms to monetize the utilization of these services by introducing sponsored search 
advertising, which is their substantial source of income (Edelman et al., 2007). Specifically, search 
providers allow advertisers to participate in a real-time auction and compete for ad slots on search 
engine results pages (SERPs). Advertisers bid on keywords and their advertisements are assigned 
a position on the SERPs in rank order based on a combination of the value of their bid and their 
quality score. Quality score is a combination of a number of factors, including landing page quality 
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and expected click-through rate (CTR) (Jansen & Spink, 2009). In general, the top ranked position 
is worth the most to an advertiser as it generates the most attention. The attention garnered from 
positions below the first are often assumed to be monotone and decreasing in value, and in many 
instances, this is true for CTRs (Chitika, 2013; Ghose & Yang, 2009). However, this is not always 
the case for conversions or revenue generation (Agarwal et al., 2011; Naldi et al., 2010). An 
analysis of over 192 million impressions and over 2 million clicks in sponsored search advertising 
shows that the highest rate of conversion occurs in position 4 with approximately 12 per 10,000 
impressions (Engine Ready, 2014). An impression is when an advertisement is served to a search 
user. A conversion is when a search user takes a desired action on the advertiser’s website (fills a 
form, downloads, makes a purchase, etc.). In addition, position results tend to vary by level of 
competition as well as advertiser type, and product/service type (Ayanso & Karimi, 2015).  
In recent years, sponsored search advertising has received significant attention both in 
academia and industry. A recent Forrester report indicated that, of the 81 online retailers surveyed, 
85 percent say that search engine marketing is one of the top three ways to acquire customers 
online (Callard, 2014). Additionally, it was reported that 45 percent have online revenues 
exceeding $100 million and that 20 percent allocate 50 percent or more of their marketing budgets 
to search engine advertising. Of the total Internet advertising revenue in 2013, search advertising 
represented 43 percent ($18.4 billion). The fastest growing area was mobile advertising, which has 
increased from 9 percent ($3.4 billion) to 17 percent ($7.1 billion) in 2012 (IAB, 2014). Market 
leaders in spend on search advertising are focusing heavily on the AdWords platform. For 
example, Wow.com, Amazon.com, and Webcrawler.com have daily ad budgets of 19.2, 14.7, and 
9.5 million, respectively (Spyfu, 2015). With such large sums of money being spent on search 
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advertising, efficient allocation of the budget among different networks, campaigns, ad groups, 
and keywords is of great importance. 
The campaign budget planning decision is a non-trivial task for advertisers, due to the 
dynamic nature of keyword advertising and the complexity of the search auction mechanism and 
bidding processes (Yang et al., 2014). Advertisers with limited budgets must consider a number 
of factors when deciding which keywords to bid on and how much to bid on them. Specifically, 
they must decide how to allocate budget across planning horizons, markets, or within the scope of 
a day (Yang et al., 2012) and across campaigns (Yang et al., 2014). In the sponsored search 
literature, the optimization of bid price and budget allocation has been studied in pursuit of 
different performance objectives, including the maximization of expected clicks (Feldman et al., 
2007; Muthukrishnan et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2014), return on investment (Chaitanya and 
Narahari, 2010), profit (Cholette et al., 2012), revenue (Dayanik & Parlar, 2013; Özlük & Cholette, 
2007; Zhang et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2008), campaign reward (Zhang et al., 2014a), as well as the 
minimization of expenditure or loss (Yang et al., 2012). Nevertheless, most of the prior studies on 
budget optimization fail to consider the functionalities of the current ad platforms provided by 
search engines, the keyword auction rules, as well as the budget account structure (Yang et al., 
2014). In addition, many of these studies lack a theoretical framework as the basis for integrating 
the issues of keyword segmentation, campaign organization, and budget allocation in sponsored 
search advertising. This thesis attempts to fill the research gaps between these issues by leveraging 
existing marketing frameworks as a theoretical guide. 
  
P a g e  | 4 
 
1.2 Research Goal and Contributions 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate whether advertisers can improve their campaign 
management and budgeting decisions by employing keyword segmentation and performance-
based budget allocation strategies in sponsored search advertising. The study uses simulation 
modeling that integrates decisions involving keyword segmentation and campaign organization in 
order to characterize different budget allocation strategies and understand their implications on 
search advertising performance. Using the buying funnel model as the basis of keyword 
segmentation and campaign organization, the study examines several budget allocation strategies 
(i.e., search Volume-based, Cost-based, and Clicks-based) and evaluates their performance 
implications for firms that may pursue different marketing objectives based on industry and or 
product/service offerings. I use the buying funnel model as my theoretical foundation due to its 
commercial and advertiser-centric focus and prior statistical validation in capturing users’ search 
intent (Jansen & Schuster, 2011). I use simulation as my methodology due to the dynamic nature 
and complexity of the budgeting decisions. It allows the modeller to capture the high number of 
decision variables and metrics in sponsored search advertising, which can then be empirically 
evaluated. Simulation is specifically chosen for its ability to test multiple decision scenarios and 
multiple performance based allocation strategies. Simulation also provides more flexibility to 
model the use of prior information in informing current decisions. 
In sponsored search advertising, keyword segmentation, campaign organization, and 
budget allocation are challenging decisions for advertisers, due to uncertainty in demand, a highly 
competitive keyword market, as well as the current multi-factor ranking mechanisms adopted by 
major search providers (Ayanso & Mokaya, 2013; Ayanso & Karimi, 2015; Jansen & Spink, 
2009). While previous literature has focused on mechanism design and bidding strategies in search 
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advertising, there has been limited research on the campaign budget allocation problem. 
Considering the complexity of search advertising process, advertisers must manage which 
keywords to bid on, how to organize ad campaigns and ad groups, and decide on how much they 
are willing to spend per click for each keyword. In addition, the competitive landscape and 
fluctuations in keyword popularity in sponsored search make the budget allocation decision across 
multiple planning horizons a non-trivial task. For instance, an advertiser must decide how to 
allocate its total sponsored search budget across search markets; across temporal slots; or across 
ad campaigns, ad groups or individual keywords, continuously (Zhang & Feng, 2011). 
Anecdotal evidence from search advertising practices show that most advertisers manage 
a large number of accounts, campaigns, ad groups, and keywords that vary in performance, budget 
consumption, and advertising goal orientation. Competition in keyword auctions is also 
increasingly growing. To remain competitive, firms need to know the various decisions involved 
in search engine advertising as well as competitors’ campaign strategies in both organic (natural) 
and paid search advertising. The absence of systematic frameworks and decision support tools for 
many of the tasks involved in this process could lead to arbitrary decisions and resource 
inefficiencies. Therefore, this study contributes to the sponsored search literature by leveraging 
the buying funnel model as the theoretical foundation and integrating the campaign budget 
allocation decision with keyword segmentation and campaign organization issues. 
Despite their intrinsic relationships and impact on all other search advertising strategies, 
previous research in search advertising mostly treated the keyword selection/segmentation 
problems (Ashkan & Clarke, 2013; Broder, 2002; Jansen et al., 2007; Jansen et al., 2008; Jansen 
and Schuster, 2011; Li, Pan, & Wang, 2010; Lu & Zhao, 2014; Rusmevichientong & Williamson, 
2007; Zhang et al., 2014b) and the budget allocation problem (Cholette et al., 2012; Dayanik & 
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Parlar, 2013; Feldman et al., 2007; Muthukrishnan et al., 2010; Özlük & Cholette, 2007; Zhang et 
al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2014a; Zhou et al., 2008) as standalone decisions. While there are various 
ways to group keywords and their characteristics (Broder, 2002; Ghose & Yang, 2009; Jansen et 
al., 2007; Lu & Zhao, 2014), the buying funnel model (Jansen & Schuster, 2011) provides a 
theoretically sound framework to bring together issues related to search advertising campaign 
strategies, keyword categorization, budget utilization, and ad performance. This is primarily due 
to the well-defined stages of the model (i.e., Awareness, Research, Decision, and Purchase) and 
the ability to capture the consumer behaviors associated with each stage of the model using the 
various performance metrics in keyword advertising (e.g., impressions, clicks, cost-per-click, 
conversions, etc.). In addition, Jansen and Shuster (2011) empirically demonstrated that the stages 
of the funnel exist in sponsored search and have statistically significant variations across all the 
stages and performance metrics. With minor variations in the marketing literature (Caspari, 2004; 
Webb, 2006), the buying funnel represents a staged process for describing the way consumers 
make their buying decisions, starting from awareness of the existence of a need to the final 
purchase stage of a product or service that addresses this need (Jansen & Schuster, 2011). Although 
the empirical analysis of Jansen and Schuster (2011) indicates that the buying funnel stages may 
not be associated with expected consumer actions as predicted by the model, their results do 
suggest that the buying funnel stages can provide a more flexible framework for advertisers to 
develop campaign priorities and define keyword segments that serve their market and product 
contexts. 
From a theoretical view, this thesis offers a unique insight into the budget allocation 
problem in sponsored search advertising by leveraging a theoretical framework for keyword 
segmentation, campaign management, and performance evaluation. Measuring keyword-level 
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performance is important given that the basic mechanism of paid search advertising operates at the 
keyword level (Özlük & Cholette, 2007; Rutz et al., 2012). As opposed to advertising in traditional 
media such as television and newspapers, keywords are sold on a per-click basis, rather than on 
per impression or exposure. Given the significant amount of money spent on keyword advertising, 
marketers need guidance and insights into this process (Dhar & Ghose, 2010; Jansen, Sobel, & 
Zhang, 2011; Lu & Zhao, 2014). Therefore, effective keyword management requires identifying 
and creating a portfolio of keywords for improved budget utilization and the subsequent 
performance of advertising campaigns. 
Inefficiency in the allocation of budget on keywords as well as campaigns is a constant 
challenge for advertisers. The complexity of the keyword selection and bid process requires a 
structured and systematic approach for segmentation and budget allocation across campaigns, ad 
groups, and individual keywords. Among the specific challenges advertisers face is the volatility 
in search demand, as it can be substantial and may have a detrimental effect on the performance 
of campaigns by causing budgets to run out early. For example, on any given day, an advertiser’s 
most expensive keyword may be highly searched early in the morning, draining the daily budget, 
and leaving no money for ads to be shown for the remainder of the day. Thus, in order to better 
manage their productive keywords, advertisers need to measure performance on a continuous basis 
and assess their impact on budget utilization. Specifically, advertisers should take advantage of 
prior performance information to inform their current decisions. Fortunately, search advertising 
platforms such as AdWords provide various flexibilities to apply specific strategies and actions by 
advertisers. However, advertisers lack the decision support tools and the insights to evaluate and 
come up with the strategies and actions that improve their performance. Therefore, from a practical 
perspective, this thesis provides insights for advertisers on operational issues such as budget 
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utilization, categorizing keywords based on different campaign objectives, and developing 
campaign strategies and prioritization in order to improve efficiency over time. 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature in search 
engine advertising (SEA). Chapter 3 focuses on the theoretical framework for the simulation 
model. Chapter 4 presents the description of the problem and the simulation model development. 
Chapter 5 introduces the empirical data and the performance measures utilized in this study. 
Chapter 6 presents the simulation results for four different cases along with the discussions. 
Chapter 7 provides the theoretical and practical implications of this study as well as limitations 
and future research directions, and finally Chapter 8 provides the study’s conclusions. 
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 Literature Review and Research context 
In 1998, Overture (originally Goto.com), which is now owned by Yahoo, invented pay-per-click 
search advertising with a first-price auction mechanism, by which advertising slots were allocated 
and sold based solely on the highest bid. Google moved from a first-price auction mechanism to a 
second-price auction design and integrated their proprietary AdRank algorithm that incorporated 
the click-through rates originally, and later the quality score, to increase the likelihood of relevant 
ads being displayed to users (Laffey, 2007). The second-price auction differs from a first-price 
auction in that, instead of bidders paying their exact bid price, they pay the bid price of the next 
highest bidder. Following Google, Yahoo and other search providers have since moved to the 
second-price auction design (Yao & Mela, 2009). This shift in ranking rule resulted from the desire 
by search providers to attract more advertisers and generate more revenue. 
Search providers must also attract and maintain the interest of search users. Therefore, the 
dynamics of the relationships among advertisers, users, and the search providers are reliant on each 
participants’ level of satisfaction within the system (Jansen & Mullen, 2008). In other words, the 
more users that utilize a given search provider’s service, the larger and more attractive the platform 
is for advertisers; and the higher the quality of the search provider’s service, the more likely it is 
to attract users and generate more revenue for search engines. Given the popularity of search 
advertising in recent years, academic research in this area has grown tremendously in the 
Marketing and Information Systems fields. Below I provide a comprehensive review of the 
literature in the following categories: mechanism design and equilibrium outcomes in keyword 
auctions; consumer search behaviour and advertising performance; keyword selection and 
advertising performance; and budget allocation and optimization. 
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2.1 Mechanism Design and Equilibrium Outcomes in Keyword Auctions 
The early research in sponsored search advertising focused on mechanism design and analysis of 
equilibrium outcomes in keyword auctions. Sponsored search results differ from natural or organic 
search results in a number of ways. Sponsored results are located on top of and beside organic 
search results. The criteria for seeing a sponsored ad differs from organic results and also differ 
across search engines. As Google has established a dominating position with approximately 88.4% 
of the search market (Statista, 2015), this thesis focuses primarily on its marketplace. However, 
the results and implications of this study can be extended to other sponsored search networks due 
to similarities across platforms. Google uses its proprietary AdRank algorithm to calculate ad 
position based on bid value and quality score. The quality score is a composition of a number of 
factors including relevance, quality of landing page, quality of text ads, and prior CTR (Lahaie, 
2006; Liu & Chen, 2006). Google’s AdWords employs a Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction 
mechanism that is an extension of the Vickery Clarke Groves (VCG) mechanism (Clarke, 1971; 
Groves, 1973; Vickrey, 1961). This is in contrast to a first price auction that awards the top slot to 
the highest bidder. 
The incorporation of the quality score and Ad Rank algorithm into Google’s GSP auction 
creates unique challenges and opportunities for advertisers. Such that, advertisers with more 
experience and a keen eye for analytics are better able to use this characteristic to their advantage. 
Not all advertisers follow the same strategy. Maximization of revenue, top position, lead 
generation, and exposure are a few examples of the different goals advertisers compete for. 
A number of researchers have studied sponsored search auctions. Feng et al. (2007) 
compared several ranking mechanisms, including Overture’s and Google’s slot allocation rules 
and found that their performance depends on the correlation between advertisers’ willingness to 
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pay and their relevance to the search term. In an intermediated search market, where ads are shown 
via paid referral, Weber and Zheng (2007) found that to generate maximum revenue, the 
mechanism should place ads based on a weighted average of bid amount and product performance. 
Studying auction equilibria under the GSP rule and under a complete information setting, Edelman 
et al. (2007) and Varian (2007) have shown that the auctioneer’s equilibrium revenue under the 
GSP rule is at least as high as that under the VCG mechanism. Additionally, under the complete-
information setting, Edelman et al. (2007) has proved that bidders will not bid their true valuation 
and that there is no dominant strategy equilibrium in GSP auctions. Kim et al. (2012) analyzed the 
optimal slot design problem and concluded that varying the number of slots based on the expected 
valuation distribution of advertisers by keyword is superior to varying the minimum bid as 
proposed by Edelman and Schwarz (2010). 
Considerable research has been conducted on the design of keyword auctions with 
advertisers’ past performance information in various settings (Chen, 2010; Lahaie, 2006; Liu & 
Chen, 2006, Liu et al., 2010). Comparing ranking rules that consider only bid price as well as the 
product of CTR and bid price, Lahaie (2006) and Liu and Chen (2006) found that the combined 
measure is more efficient, but neither of the rules is revenue-maximizing. Liu et al. (2010) 
extended the study by Liu and Chen (2006) in a generalized multi-slot setting to study the use of 
differentiated minimum bids, together with the weighted ranking rule, as a way of exploiting ex 
ante information on advertisers. Additionally, Chen (2010) further extended this to a situation in 
which advertisers may improve their performance for their own interest in reaction to the 
performance-based ranking policy. 
Zhu and Wilbur (2011) empirically examined the effects of a hybrid auction that 
incorporates bids for both cost-per-click (CPC) and cost-per-one-thousand impressions (CPM). 
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They examined two types of advertisers:  those who are interested in immediate results such as 
increased sales, and those who are brand focused and interested in creating goodwill through 
exposure that can be used persuasively in the future. From an ROI maximization standpoint, 
Auerbach et al. (2008) examined advertisers’ behavior within the Yahoo! Webscope on the top 
1000 keywords, and tested a model on both first and second-price auctions. They classified bidders 
by levels of ROI maximization and found that within both auction types, the majority of advertisers 
are pursuing a simplified form of ROI maximization, or full ROI maximization strategies. 
Considering ad quality in sponsored search advertising, Animesh et al. (2010) examined 
keyword auction designs to determine whether low-quality firms are able to mimic and execute 
the strategies of high-quality firms. They identified that low-quality firms are in fact able to attain 
high positions within sponsored search markets that only consider bid price for allocating 
advertising slots on SERPs. However, when a search provider incorporates an intervening 
mechanism such as Google’s AdRank algorithm that applies a quality score to each advertiser, this 
same effect was not observed. Thus, the incorporation of additional attributes that measure quality 
of an advertiser within the auction mechanism design aids in the market’s ability to protect 
advertisers from direct threats of new entrants and low-quality firms. These results also further 
emphasize the importance of attaining and maintaining a good quality score in the competition for 
ad slots. In general, most of the studies in this category provide the theoretical foundations in 
search advertising research. 
 
2.2 Consumer Search Behaviour and Advertising Performance 
User perception and behaviour in sponsored advertisement has been another area of focus in the 
sponsored search literature. The purpose of investigation is to examine the factors that impact the 
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user’s actions such as clicking on ads, or purchasing a product (i.e., conversion). By identifying 
how users interact and react to advertisements within the search engine results pages (SERPs), 
advertisers are better able to tailor their sponsored search initiatives to achieve marketing goals. 
The return advertisers seek need not be specifically in the form of increased revenues or profits, 
as it may also be their goal to create awareness, and further persuade and convince search users to 
trust their brands. 
Most of the research on users search behavior is focused on the interactions of users within 
search engines that include separate and distinguishable ads (i.e., sponsored and organic ads). For 
example, to analyze user behaviour when the lines between organic and sponsored search results 
are not clear, Jansen and Spink (2007) analyzed data from a meta-search engine (that combines 
sponsored and organic results) web log of nearly 2 million queries. Utilizing Broder’s (2002) 
categories; informational, transactional, and navigational, the researchers ordered the query 
patterns of the roughly 7 hundred thousand users chronologically to predict CTR. Interestingly, 
they found that users are no more likely to click on sponsored ads when the ads are mixed with 
organic results, and the number of clicks on sponsored ads actually decreases. Due to the character 
and spacing limits placed on sponsored ads, in contrast to the more information rich organic results, 
this result may not be surprising. Thus, advertisers should consider richness of ad format when 
selecting the type of advertisement to use. Additionally, the study found that the percentage split 
into categories is heavily skewed toward the informational category, as opposed to the other two 
categories (Jansen & Spink, 2007). 
On the other hand, Yang and Ghose (2010) examined the effects that organic results have 
on sponsored ad click-through behaviour and the inverse relationship. Employing aggregate 
consumer level data, the researchers empirically tested for interdependence between organic and 
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sponsored search engine results and their effects on profitability. Their findings show that there is 
a positive interdependence between both listings, with a stronger relationship from organic to 
sponsored results, which suggests that both Search Engine Optimization (SEO) and Pay-per-Click 
(PPC) advertising will increase a firms’ revenues by increasing the likelihood a user will interact 
with a link. Furthermore, they tested to see the combined effect of having both organic and 
sponsored ads and found that there is a significant increase in profit potential by having both 
present on SERPs.  This finding indicates that an advertiser will benefit from balancing SEO and 
PPC, while the absence of SEO, or good organic results placement mostly diminishes profit 
potential. 
Ghose and Yang (2009) also found that landing page quality positively impacts the cost-
per-click (CPC) that the advertiser pays as well as the likelihood of conversion. This implies that 
the better an advertiser’s landing page is with respect to all aspects of Google’s Ad Rank algorithm, 
the less expensive a higher position is on the SERP. Thus, advertisers with limited budgets should 
allocate more resources to improving quality score. Additionally, they found that consumers are 
more likely to click on retailer-specific keywords and less likely to click on longer or brand-
specific keywords. 
To address limitations in extant literature, Braun and Moe (2013) investigated the effects 
of ad creative heterogeneity by incorporating numerous ad creative characteristics into their model. 
Frequency and timeliness of ad exposure can enhance or hinder an advertiser’s goal of generating 
conversions online. Braun and Moe (2013) explored this issue by examining ad impression 
histories while varying ad creatives and incorporate advertising goodwill, a construct that allows 
for accumulation and decay of “goodwill”. Through simulation, it was shown that the proposed 
model increases expected visits by 12.7 percent and increases conversions by 13.8 percent (Braun 
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& Moe, 2013, p. 754). Thus, by varying ad creatives and by creating ad impression history policies, 
the advertiser can significantly improve acquisition and conversion of their target audiences. The 
study by Brettel and Spilker-Attig’s (2010) on differences across national cultures further supports 
this argument, as their results indicate that it is also beneficial to vary ads based on location. This, 
in combination with the frequency adjustment tool available to advertisers in Google’s AdWords, 
can aid in the pursuit of revenue generation while limiting loss from overexposure. “Conventional 
wisdom is that the optimal frequency for most campaigns is around 4-7 ad exposures, and much 
beyond that, results hit a point of diminishing returns for both brand and direct response objectives” 
(Agashe, 2010, p. 11). Therefore, by varying and tracking multiple ad creatives, an advertiser can 
increase the likelihood of a user clicking. 
Kim and Sundar (2010) empirically examined whether the negative effects of ad clutter are 
moderated by ad relevance and that perceived intrusiveness of an ad mediates the attitudes of 
consumers towards ads and ad hosting websites. Their results indicate that relevance of an ad plays 
an extremely important role in reducing negative perceptions of ads in cluttered and non-cluttered 
environments. However, perceived intrusiveness does not operate as a mediator of consumer 
attitudes. This study was limited to a small sample of respondents and may not replicate in varying 
conditions. However, these results suggest that an advertiser should ensure that relevance is a 
priority when creating advertisements. Similar to Kim and Sundar (2010), Goldfarb and Tucker 
(2011a) utilized a survey and examined user behaviour, empirically testing for factors that cause 
users to balk at online advertisements. The results indicate that user’s privacy concerns play a 
crucial role in determining the likelihood of clicking on an advertisement. Additionally, the 
analysis showed that an ad with a combination of being highly targeted (to the website or results 
pages it is displayed on) and very obtrusive (bigger and bolder details) turns users off. On the other 
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hand, each setting separately increases the likelihood of a user interacting with an ad. This is 
relevant to both of Google’s advertising platforms, AdWords (PPC) and AdSense (Google’s 
display network). Specifically, this suggests that well targeted plaintext ads will benefit the 
advertiser in both domains and the deployment of obscure but boldfaced and attractive ads on 
AdSense will also garner more interaction. 
The ability of the advertiser to track ads that impact a consumer’s purchase raises additional 
challenges. To address this issue Abishek et al. (2012) proposed a dynamic hidden Markov model 
using the stages of the conversion funnel (buying funnel) to model the attribution problem. They 
found that display ads behave as a primer for the movement of consumers from the initial stage of 
dormancy to the latter stages of the model. In general, the studies dealing with consumer search 
behaviour have a number of implications for advertisers in their pursuit of efficient allocation of 
resources as well as maximizing advertising performance. 
 
2.3 Keyword Selection and Advertising Performance 
The volume of keywords to choose from is enormous, considering the combinations and 
permutations of virtually unlimited strings of words and symbols that may be relevant for an 
advertiser. Advertisers can select keywords using a variety of keyword suggestion tools available 
online (see, for example, Chen (2010) for a list). Nevertheless, the identification and selection of 
high utility keywords for a specific marketing goal is a non-trivial problem. Yang et al. (2013) 
formulated the selection of keywords as an optimization problem with a multi-level computational 
framework that creates two distinct pools of keywords (Domain-specific and Market-level), that 
are subsequently assigned to campaigns and ad groups and adjusted dynamically. Ji et al. (2010) 
empirically examined a set of keywords using characteristics such as keyword length, rank, and 
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CTR to predict the identification of high potential candidate keywords and generate additional and 
more relevant keywords. Abhishek and Hosanagar (2007) developed a keyword generation system 
called Wordy that seeks out similar, highly relevant, and potentially under-utilized keywords using 
semantic similarity. Others have looked at this problem using existing keywords, ad quality, and 
the advertiser’s propensity to pay (Feng et al., 2007), and by selecting keywords from a profit-to-
cost ratio ranking (Rusmevichientong & Williamson, 2006). While each of these approaches can 
benefit the advertiser by identifying keywords of higher value, the processes of generating 
keywords is computationally intensive or require significant amount of historical data. 
Furthermore, the value of a keyword depends on the criterion an advertiser chooses to use. 
For example, the popularity, competition, bid valuations, and conversion value to advertiser may 
dictate the value of a keyword. In addition, there are keyword combinations that can lead to 
negative effects on campaign spend, and certain words are more open to invalid clicks from 
customers seeking unrelated products. To address this issue, Kiritchenko and Jiline (2008) used 
classification and machine learning techniques to identify keywords and their combinations along 
with adding the removal of negative keyword associations into their model to improve the keyword 
selection process. The use of negative keywords is an important task as it reduces the number of 
invalid clicks that the advertiser must pay for (i.e., clicks by users who may not be actually looking 
for product or service offered by the advertiser). As a simple example, a horse shoe sales company 
would likely bid on “horse shoes” and a user searching for “horse shoe pit” would trigger its ad. If 
the user clicks, this results in an invalid click and would cost the advertiser. 
Not all firms are equally efficient in practicing PPC advertising. As Ayanso and Mokaya 
(2013) found through their analysis of 200 of the top 500 Web retailers, many firms are 
characterized by inefficiencies in terms of different resources and performance measures. 
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Employing data envelopment analysis combined with principal component analysis (PCA-DEA), 
they identified significant variations in the efficiency of firms that are Web-only versus multi-
channel. They found that efficiency for multi-channel retailers (MCRs) is primarily explained by 
the performance metrics of sales, conversion rate, impressions, and CTR; whereas, organic and 
sponsored search ranks mainly reveal the differences in efficiency of web-only retailers (WORs). 
This suggests that each type of retailer must focus their efforts and competition strategies 
accordingly. Ghose and Yang (2009) also empirically examined keyword-level effects and found 
results that challenge the previous assumption that value per click is uniform across ad positions 
(Aggarwal et al., 2007; Edelman et al., 2007; Varian, 2007). They also found that retailer-specific 
keywords increase click-through behaviour by 14.27%, whereas brand-specific keywords decrease 
click-through by 56.6%, and keyword length decreases clicks by 13.9%. These results suggest that 
keywords should be managed in segments as their performances depend on different 
categorizations. 
This thesis addresses the keyword management issue in terms of keyword segmentation 
that is aligned with the specific campaign objectives of an advertiser. More specifically, I draw on 
the buying funnel framework (Jansen & Schuster, 2011) for segmenting keywords and organizing 
campaigns based on this categorization to serve an advertiser’s product and market context. 
 
2.4 Budget Allocation and Optimization 
Despite being the antecedent to all other sponsored search decisions, budget and its allocation has 
mostly been overlooked in the literature. Given that no advertiser has an unlimited pool of capital 
to spend on sponsored search campaigns, the problem of determining how to allocate available 
resources is very important. Advertisers must determine the maximum daily amount they are 
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willing to spend on sponsored search, how many and which keywords to bid on, and how much to 
bid on them. In recent years, many researchers have recognized the potential for improving the 
allocation of budget within the search advertising paradigm. 
The budget allocation problem has been investigated as part of other sponsored search 
decisions where budget is defined as a constraint for these decisions (Chakrabarty, Zhou, & 
Lukose, 2008; Kitts & LeBlanc, 2004). Other related studies have looked at optimizing the 
allocation of budget across keywords using bid price settings (Chaitanya & Narahari, 2012; 
Cholette et al., 2012; Dayanik & Parlar, 2013; Feldman et al., 2007; Muthukrishnan et al., 2010; 
Özlük & Cholette, 2007; Zhou et al., 2008), optimizing bid price settings and budget allocation 
over temporal slots or markets simultaneously within a single campaign (Yang et al., 2012; Zhang 
et al., 2014), jointly optimizing bid price settings and campaign budgets (Zhang et al., 2012), and 
optimizing budget allocation over several campaigns while considering substitution and 
complementarity effects (Yang et al., 2014). 
By adjusting bid prices, advertisers are able to attain different positions on the SERPs and 
different click-through performance based on the resulting positions. For some keywords such as 
the ones that include brand name or highly competitive keywords, the top position may be the most 
desirable. Due to the variation in demand, competition, and performance across keywords, 
determining the optimal bid price for each keyword under budget constrain is a complex task that 
many researchers have attempted to address. For example, under a budget constraint, Özlük and 
Cholette (2007) created a deterministic model that compares and sets the bid price of two separate 
keywords based on their expected performance outcomes. They generalized the problem to N 
keywords and consider a condition of adding a new keyword to the pool (N+1), where if the value 
of the keyword being introduced is sufficient, some of the budget used for the other keywords is 
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allocated to it. Cholette et al. (2012) improved upon this previous model by introducing the 
probability to rank as a function of bid price, and showing how this affects the trade-off between 
profit and risk and its efficiency frontier on a single keyword. They also expanded their model to 
multiple keywords, but found that the problem quickly becomes computationally too expensive 
with a probabilistic budget constraint. The results of their analysis showed that by adding a 
probabilistic budgeting constraint, an advertiser’s expected revenue actually falls. 
Dayanik and Parlar (2013) formulated bid price setting as a dynamic stochastic net revenue 
optimization problem and compared alternative bidding strategies varying in computational 
intensity and policy with a hard budget constraint in different advertising scenarios. They found 
that the dynamic bidding strategy, solved using dynamic programming that continuously adjusts 
bid price based on remaining daily budget, outperforms all other models in net revenue. Feldman 
et al. (2007) examined complex and simple bidding strategies and found that a two-bid uniform 
bidding strategy, where all keywords are bid on with the same price or all with a second price, 
outperforms the optimum by 63 percent. Chaitanya and Narahari (2012) considered budget and 
bid optimization problems via linear programming, employing two different bid strategies called 
OPT and MAX, both using a greedy approach that is designed to reach an envy-free equilibrium 
between which keywords to select and how much to bid for each. Each model performs better than 
baseline comparisons under different circumstances of synchronicity. While they do solve this 
analytically, it becomes extremely complex and beyond the capability of most advertisers to 
employ it practically. Additionally, the setting of bid price problem has been analysed with 
multiple dynamic click estimation models (Muthukrishnan et al., 2010) and as a multiple choice 
knapsack problem optimized with stochastic and deterministic bidding algorithms (Zhou et al., 
2008). While these studies improve upon the bid price setting problem, they do not consider the 
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hierarchy of budget accounts. In addition, some only consider a single advertising slot, which does 
not reflect the actual PPC bidding tools currently supported by search providers. 
Zhang et al. (2012) analyzed p-accounts (partially running out) and proposed the joint 
optimization of both bid price and campaign budget allocation using sequential quadratic 
programming. They reported the significance of lost opportunity of the partially running out 
accounts from both the advertiser and search provider perspective. In addition, they highlighted 
the challenge of allocating campaign budgets across the account with reported average number of 
campaigns of 15 and a maximum of over 2000. The proposed joint optimization of bids and 
campaign budgets achieves improved performance across all performance measures, such as 
average ad impressions, average expected clicks, advertiser revenue, and search engine revenue. 
However, the focus is on the maximization of utility or value per click (VPC) and does not consider 
the purpose of any of the campaigns or of the sponsored search initiative as a whole. 
Zhang et al. (2014) examined the budget allocation and bid price setting problem as real 
time adjustments of bid prices and budget to control how spend is allocated across a temporal 
period (day). While demonstrating improvement over a baseline methods, the proposed method of 
allocation ignores the context of keywords and the underlying purpose of the campaigns they are 
placed in. The study also focused on the way budget is spent over time under a single campaign 
and does not consider the interdependencies of the keywords or marketing goals. 
Yang et al. (2014) proposed a method of campaign budget allocation using marketing 
concepts of substitution relationships or overlapping degree. Using a tri-dimensional space to show 
the degree of overlap among promotional periods, campaign contents, and target areas, they 
demonstrate that a high degree of overlap reduces the overall advertising performance in terms of 
revenue and that advertising effort can be diminished if the degree of overlap between campaigns 
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is ignored. These findings serve as a good motivation for this thesis and the problem it attempts to 
address. While their study identifies the importance of substitution effects such as the degree of 
complementarity between two campaigns, it does not incorporate keyword segmentation as the 
basis for campaign organization and budget allocation decisions. 
The challenges faced by advertisers in optimal bid price setting, keyword selection and 
segmentation, and budget allocation across campaigns, make sponsored search advertising a 
lucrative area for research. The determination of optimal bid price across an array of diverse 
keywords is complex and often computationally expensive. While this solves bid price problem 
for each campaign separately, it does not take into consideration the performance of all campaigns 
simultaneously and the allocation of the account level budget across the different campaigns and 
ad groups to ensure better overall advertising performance. Motivated by these challenges and the 
findings of the related studies reviewed above, this thesis addresses the sponsored search budget 
allocation problem by examining different budget allocation strategies through simulation 
modeling. Using the buying funnel framework as the basis of keyword segmentation and campaign 
organization, this thesis attempts to bridge the research gaps between the issues of keyword 
segmentation, campaign organization, and budget allocation in the search advertising body of 
knowledge. 
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 Theoretical Frameworks 
Advertisers face several challenges when planning sponsored search campaigns, which include 
deciding how much budget to allocate over a timed horizon, and determining which keywords to 
bid on as well as how much to bid on them. For example, a company with a single product/service 
that operates in a single region or market may have numerous reasons for having multiple adverting 
campaigns. Specifically, the company’s product or service may have different price points, serve 
more than one purpose or have a variety of benefits, target multiple demographic groups, or may 
be marketed via multiple distribution channels (online or offline), or via different promotions. 
Campaigns may be organized based on any number of strategies such as positioning in different 
regions or countries, positioning amongst competitors, or any other form of market segmentation, 
all of them providing a rationale for keyword categorization, campaign organization and 
prioritization, and resource allocation. 
Recognizing this challenge, Fischer et al. (2014) developed a decision support model for 
allocating budget across countries, products, and marketing channels such as direct mail, and print 
media. By dissecting the global budget (in sponsored search, the equivalent of account level 
budget) into country-product-marketing activity level, they are able to incorporate multiple criteria 
into the allocation heuristic, such as size of business, profit contribution margin, growth potential, 
short term potential, time value of money, and carryover effects. In doing so, their model increased 
overall profit improvement potential by approximately 50%. Of particular note is the incorporation 
of carryover effects and a growth function based on the profile of a product, which is modelled 
according to diffusion along the product development life cycle. Their model also incorporates a 
sponsored search market specific adaptation of these two criteria and the use of a modified 
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heuristic with keyword related criteria that capitalize on the characteristics of the sponsored search 
auction environment. 
There are a number of strategic marketing frameworks that provide firms with meaningful 
ways to plan their marketing initiatives. This thesis is particularly motivated by prior empirical 
consumer search behavior research that provides the basis for keyword categorization, resource 
allocation, and performance improvement (Broder, 2002; Jansen et al., 2007; Jansen et al., 2008; 
Jansen & Schuster, 2011; Nottorf & Funk, 2013). These frameworks include the taxonomy of 
search user intent (Broder, 2002; Jansen et al., 2007; Jansen et al., 2008), spillover effects from 
generic to branded search (Nottorf & Funk, 2013), and more importantly, the buying funnel model 
that is empirically tested by Jansen and Schuster (2011). 
 
3.1 Taxonomy of Search User Intent 
The literature on the classification and categorization of keywords is focussed on either the user’s 
or advertiser’s perspective. The bulk of the literature to date has been conducted on the former. 
The expansion of this area of research benefits the advertiser by allowing heterogeneity across 
users’ search behaviours or identifying criteria for selecting more profitable keywords. One of the 
early taxonomies used for classification of search user intent was introduced by Broder (2002). It 
includes three categories: Informational, Navigational, and Transactional. In the Informational 
category, the user is finding information expected to be present on a page or multiple pages; in the 
Navigational category, the user is interested in reaching a particular site; and in the Transactional 
category, the user intends to further engage with the internet by shopping or attaining downloads 
or accessing additional web enabled tools. The results of the random Alta Vista survey were that 
roughly 20 percent of queries are navigational, 48 percent are informational, and 30 percent are 
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transactional. However, the sample for the survey was small and the categories were not clearly 
defined (Broder, 2002). 
To further refine the definitions and classification of user intent using these categories, 
Jansen et al. (2008) derived additional attributes of each. In addition to creating a more 
comprehensive classification schema, they also manually classify a random sample of 400 search 
queries and develop an algorithm for automatic classification of web queries. The data consisted 
of a Web transaction log with over one and a half million queries, and the automatic classification 
algorithm resulted in an overall accuracy of 74 percent. They concluded that approximately 80 
percent of all Web searches are informational, 10 percent navigational, and 10 percent 
transactional. This taxonomy and the operationalized definitions offer additional value to an 
advertiser by providing a basic structure of how users are querying search engines. An additional 
benefit is that this ontology can be directly applied to an existing search advertising campaign and 
used to pursue objectives related to each category. However, this taxonomy only identifies a small 
portion of transactional queries using a Web transaction log that advertisers typically do not have 
access to, and the results do not offer actionable marketing insights beyond informing advertisers 
that the majority of search queries are informational in nature. Further, the authors acknowledge 
that roughly 25 percent of the queries were misclassified and that many of the queries could be 
classified as one or more type.  Operationalizing this taxonomy in the sponsored search domain 
may not be also a straightforward process as it does not primarily focus on understanding the 
commercial intent of a search user (i.e., purchase a product or sign up for a service). 
Ashkan and Clarke (2013) developed the classification of search user intent further to 
include a more comprehensive hierarchical ontology. They extended the categories by developing 
a subcategory called commercial intent, and subsume transactional queries into either navigational 
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or informational for simplicity. User’s queries are split into “major dimensions of query intent”, 
commercial/non-commercial, where the commercial label is applied when it is assumed that the 
user is planning to purchase at the time of the query or in the future (Ashkan & Clarke, 2013, p. 
431). The “subcategories of commercial intent” are retailer, product, and brand. These 
subcategories effectively differentiate between the user’s purpose of search for products/services 
(p. 431). Utilizing a Web transaction log obtained from the Beyond Search program (developed 
by Microsoft Research and Microsoft adCenter in 2007) of roughly 100 million search 
impressions, the researchers identified variation in estimated CTRs across categories and 
subcategories of commercial intent. While this study provides an advertiser with additional context 
in which to classify users across keywords, it does not provide additional insights beyond 
identifying keywords with commercial intent. Moreover, the authors did not define explicitly the 
characteristics of each category – commercial and non-commercial. 
Bridging the gap between the search user intent taxonomy and its commercial/non-
commercial extension is the work of Rutz and Bucklin (2011), which shows that there is a positive 
and asymmetric advertising effect from generic to branded terms, and its expansion by Nottorf and 
Funk (2013). Using a dynamic linear model with Bayesian estimation, Rutz and Bucklin (2011) 
showed that there is a positive and asymmetric advertising effect from generic to branded terms. 
Utilizing two latent constructs, awareness from impressions, and awareness from clicks, Nottorf 
and Funk (2013) also proposed a model that accounts for generic impressions and clicks in addition 
to the carryover and spillover effects of previous searches with their respective parameters. The 
model captures impressions, clicks, conversions and keyword-level data that is classified into 
branded or generic and then into industry related subgroups. They also controlled for seasonality 
and measure for weekly, daily, and hourly effects. As the user begins to search for a product, the 
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search can be very broad and lacks specific context such as searching for “new car”, and after 
subsequent searches and exploration, the user ends up searching for “mid-size Nissan 4 door”. As 
the user progresses to the final search term, an advertiser may be able to attract attention by 
advertising its product/services at different levels of broadness. Nottorf and Funk (2013) developed 
dynamic linear models and determined that there are significant differences in spillover effects 
across industries and suggested that high involvement and longer term purchase decisions induce 
more spillover. While this framework does consider the commercial intent of search users, it does 
not provide a comprehensive categorization of search queries. 
Motivated by the works of Rutz and Bukilin (2011) on spillover effects, and Ghose and 
Yang’s (2010) examination of cross-category purchasing in sponsored search, Lu and Zhao (2014) 
categorized keywords into three categories: general, specific, and “other” (or irrelevant). General 
and specific categories reflect the stages of the shopping goals theory as defined by Lee and Ariely 
(2006). Shopping goals theory recognizes the development of more concrete shopping goals as the 
consumer proceeds through their shopping process. The theory has two stages. In the first one, the 
consumer is broadly defining and developing their consideration sets and shopping goals. In this 
stage they are susceptible to persuasion from external sources. Once the consumer has formed 
solid shopping goals, in the second and final stage, they seek out satisfying these goals. This 
suggests that the consumer is more likely to remain focussed on these goals and be less inclined to 
change their mind via external stimuli such as advertisements. The researchers argue that general 
keywords are used more by consumers in the early stage without shopping goals, and that specific 
keywords are used by those in the later stages with more concrete shopping goals. Using a dataset 
from Taobao.com for the “digital camera” product category, Lu and Zhao (2014) identified 
products as either main or accessory, and attributed sales to either direct sales or indirect sales. 
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They model the problem using two structural equation models, one with direct sales as the 
dependent variable, and the other one with indirect sales as the dependent variable. Using product 
type as a moderator, they found that shopping goals theory can be used to explain consumer 
behavior in search engine advertising. Their model confirms that direct sales via specific keywords 
are more likely from consumers with well-formed shopping goals and that they are less likely to 
be persuaded. In contrast, general keywords lead more to indirect sales which suggests that 
consumers using general keywords may not have well-formed consideration sets or shopping goals 
and are more likely to change their minds and purchase other products. In addition, they found that 
product type is a moderator of specific keywords on direct and indirect sales. 
Each of these ontologies provides a lens into the way consumers interact with search 
engines. However, the search user intent model does not sufficiently explain or operationalize how 
advertisers should be selecting keywords. Specifically, it does not help an advertiser to decide how 
to attract, motivate, or convert consumers from informational or navigational to transactional. It 
only offers a means to segment keywords based on the type of searcher they are assumed to attract. 
The latter research on generic to branded keywords and from general to specific keywords do 
recognize the commercial or purchase intent of search users and confirm that consumers do 
progress through different stages of intent. However, while they are empirically validated, the 
models do not provide advertisers with sufficient actionable descriptions of their classification 
schemes. They also provide limited diversity across keywords, with only two categories in each 
case. 
In contrast, the buying funnel model, which is empirically validated by Jansen and Shuster 
(2011), provides four distinct categories and captures the spillover effect or progression of 
consumers into different stages of purchase intent. The buying funnel model is well known in 
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practice and it does not assume indirect or direct sales typical of multiproduct or multiservice 
providers. Thus, the model is applicable to any advertiser in a B2B or B2C context. Considering 
its comprehensive classification scheme and popularity in practice, in this thesis I employ the 
buying funnel model as the main theoretical framework for keyword segmentation and campaign 
organization. 
 
3.2 The Buying Funnel Model 
The buying funnel is a popular marketing paradigm that is commonly utilized in search marketing 
initiatives (Jansen & Schuster, 2011). Sometimes referred to as the buying cycle or sales funnel 
(Caspari, 2004; Webb, 2006), it is considered to be a sequential process consumers follow when 
making a purchase (Ramos & Cota, 2008; Seda, 2004), similar to the progression as suggested in 
the shopping goals theory (Lu & Zhao, 2014). It is a relatively simple yet powerful model of how 
consumers behave when interacting with advertisements, and is derived from traditional models 
such as the marketing funnel (Howard & Sheth, 1969; Myerson & Scarborough, 2007; Young et 
al., 2006), conversion funnel (Abhishek, Fader, & Hosanagar, 2012), AIDA model (Lancaster & 
Withey, 2006), and hierarchy of effects model (Lavidge & Steiner, 1961). Jansen and Shuster 
(2011) also emphasize that the buying funnel is founded on information processing theory and 
consumer behaviour models (Bettman et al., 1998). It is referred to in the sponsored search 
literature as the purchase process as early as 2009 (Naldi et al., 2009), and as early as 1996 in the 
online advertising literature (Hoffman & Novak, 1996).  Indicating the presence of several minor 
variations in the marketing literature, Jansen and Schuster (2011) describe the buying funnel model 
as a four-stage model, which includes the stages of awareness, research, decision, and purchase. 
According to their descriptions, awareness refers to a consumer noticing a product or service that 
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will satisfy a need or desire, which is then followed by a research stage in which the consumer 
actively seeks out additional information related to the product type in order to become more 
knowledgeable about it before making a decision. In the decision stage, the consumer decides 
between brands of a specific product by forming a choice set before making a purchase in the final 
stage. In the purchase stage, the consumer knows what product and brand they want to purchase, 
but the consumer is doing price or bundle comparison prior to making a purchase. 
Based on the above descriptions, Jansen and Schuster (2011) classified keywords into the 
buying funnel and empirically validated that each stage (Awareness, Research, Decision, and 
Purchase) does in fact exist. However, while each stage is statistically different by all measures of 
performance, they noted that consumer progression through the funnel may not follow the 
traditional approach from awareness through purchase, but instead consumers may choose to 
purchase at any stage of the funnel. This phenomenon is also noted in Lu and Zhao’s (2014) study 
and may be explained by indirect sales from general keywords. Additionally, Abishek et al. (2012) 
used a hidden Markov model with the buying funnel as its stages and found differences in 
consumer behaviour and contributions by online marketing channels (display vs. search). For 
example, the number of orders, number of items ordered, and average sales revenue were found to 
be highest in the awareness stage which shows that the bulk of purchases are made in the awareness 
stage, not the purchase stage (Jansen & Schuster, 2011). In addition, awareness queries were found 
to have the highest number of clicks and impressions, but the lowest average CPC. This is counter 
to the expectation that the purchase queries would have the largest revenue generation and most 
orders. Nevertheless, their classification scheme and the results of their analysis provide the 
motivation as well as the theoretical foundation of this study, due primarily to the flexibility of the 
framework in applying the stages of the buying funnel to an advertiser’s unique market and product 
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context. These results are also in line with the results of Nottorf and Funk’s (2013) study of 
spillover effects from generic to branded searches, where they suggested that depending on 
industry and product type, it is in the advertiser’s interest to look into broader terms as keyword 
choices. 
Other researchers also identified that product type plays a role in consumer purchase 
behaviour at different purchase intent stages (Lu & Zhao, 2014). Therefore, the buying funnel 
model provides a more comprehensive theoretical basis for this study to develop keyword 
segmentation as well as campaign management and prioritization in the sponsored search domain. 
While valuation based on conversions or clicks may seem logical as the performance measure to 
evaluate sponsored search outcomes, their sole pursuit may not apply to all advertisers when an 
advertiser is not attempting to sell a service or good, and instead may be seeking to increase 
awareness of an event or brand (Naldi et al., 2010). Jansen and Schuster (2011) acknowledged 
counter-intuitive results in the flow of searchers from one cognitive stage to the next within their 
data, with more searches happening in the research stage and more revenue generated at the 
awareness stage. This may be due to the significant differences in how a shopper is provided 
information on a product when seeking online versus offline. Specifically, search engine result 
pages and the landing pages the ads point to are information rich ad spaces. 
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 Keyword Advertising Decision Scenario 
Search advertising has become a dynamic and more complex process, where advertisers select 
keywords, create multiple ad campaigns and ad groups, and repeatedly submit bids based on their 
maximum cost-per-click (most they are willing to pay) for keywords in their account (inventory). 
The results of the auction process are dynamic throughout the day, and the CPC charged and the 
resulting ad positions may vary from time to time (auction to auction). An advertiser must decide 
how to allocate its total sponsored search budget across search markets (i.e., different search 
providers, or search versus content networks within a given search provider such as Google’s 
AdWords versus AdSense); across temporal slots (i.e., monthly, daily budget, and promotion 
periods, etc.); or across ad campaigns, ad groups or individual keywords dynamically to limit the 
opportunity costs of running out of budget early (Zhang & Feng, 2011). As many advertisers’ 
accounts are currently organized by products/services, the ability to track marketing objectives by 
campaign is limited in this setting. Further, the allocation of daily budget is done by the advertiser 
either at the account level or campaign level, as shown in Table 4-1. 
An advertiser can choose to set the total budget or allow the budget to be automatically 
adjusted by Google in order to ensure that the daily budget does not run out early or that maximum 
performance is achieved (Google, 2015). This automatic adjustment favours click maximization 
which is in Google’s interest and may not account for the advertiser’s specific marketing 
objectives. Therefore, the use of this method may be ineffective for advertisers that seek other 
performance goals such as exposure or high search volume. In this research, I use the buying funnel 
framework as a basis for synchronizing the keyword segmentation and campaign organization 
efforts and facilitating the allocation of an advertiser’s account-level budget to multiple sponsored 
search campaigns. Using simulation modelling and keyword advertising data of four different 
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Fortune500 companies as cases, I evaluate the outcome of cost-based, search volume-based, and 
click-based allocation heuristics against a baseline allocation. 
Table 4-1 The current state of Google’s AdWords account hierarchy and budget setting 
options 
AD GROUP AD GROUP AD GROUP AD GROUP
CAMPAIGN CAMPAIGN
Budget                                                                    
Settings
ACCOUNT
Ads 
Keywords
Ads 
Keywords
Ads 
Keywords
Ads 
Keywords
Budget                       
Settings
Budget                       
Settings
 
4.1 Description of Problem 
In this thesis, the budget allocation problem is formulated at the search network level (e.g., 
AdWords account), where the objective is to determine how the search network account level 
budget is allocated to multiple ad campaigns. Using the buying funnel model as the basis of 
keyword segmentation as well as campaign or ad group organization, the performances of different 
allocation strategies (search volume-based, cost-based, and click-based) and their implications on 
different marketing objectives are investigated. Simulation modeling is used to capture the search 
advertising process, events, the advertiser’s actions, and performance outcomes in a given time 
horizon. Multiple search advertising performance measures that are defined in the sponsored 
search literature and/or industry practice are used, along with competitive keyword data from 
Spyfu.com. 
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Characteristics of a product/service such as the stage of its development life cycle can drive 
the specific types of keywords that may be used in different campaigns. The product development 
life-cycle is a good example for illustrating why campaigns may have different types of keywords 
representing each stage of the buying funnel and why a budget allocation strategy is important. 
Consider, for example, an advertiser’s AdWords account with two campaigns. One campaign, 
designed to introduce a new product into the market, may have a large number of awareness 
keywords and fewer keywords representing the other stages of the buying funnel. In this case, 
impressions (the typical measure of exposure and awareness in sponsored search) may be what the 
advertiser is more likely to maximize. While a second campaign, designed around a promotion for 
a discounted mature product, may have a large number of keywords representing decision or 
purchase stages and fewer keywords representing the other stages of the buying funnel. In this 
case, clicks and conversions may be the metrics the advertiser is more likely to maximize. Given 
this variation in campaign organization and performance prioritization, different strategies for 
allocating the account level budget will impact the outcomes of the aforementioned campaigns in 
different ways. Thus, characterising the performance variations and examining the implications on 
different marketing objectives provide actionable insights for advertisers to improve their resource 
utilization. The following simulation comprises 16 total scenarios (i.e., four experiments tested 
under four budget allocation scenarios, including the baseline). 
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4.2 Simulation Model Development 
To capture the dynamics of the sponsored search environment, the simulation model is formulated. 
Using historical keyword advertising data from Spyfu.com, the daily search volume, CPC, and the 
positions of ads are projected. The notation used in the simulation model is summarized in Table 
4-2. 
Table 4-2 Notation 
Parameter Description 
j  Campaign identifier, where mj ,...,2,1 .  
i  Keyword identifier in campaign j , where  jni ,...,2,1 . 
k  Allocation strategy identifier, where 4,3,2,1k ;  1 represents  
Baseline, 2  Cost-based, 3  Volume-based, and 4  Clicks-based. 
tB   
The overall advertising budget set for time period t . 
jk tC  The amount of advertising budget allocated to campaign j using 
allocation strategy k  during time period t , where t
m
j
jkt BC 
1
. 
jk t  The allocation proportion calculated for campaign j using allocation 
strategy k  during time period t , where 1
1


m
j
jkt . 
ijtQ  A random variable with )(),(),( ijtijtijt QMaxandQEQMin , representing 
the number of searches of keyword i  from campaign j  during time 
period t . 
ijtCPC  A random variable with )(),(),( ijtijtijt CPCMaxandCPCECPCMin , 
representing the cost-per-click of keyword i  from campaign j  during 
time period t . 
ijtPOS  A random variable with )(),(),( ijtijtijt POSMaxandPOSEPOSMin , 
representing the ad position of keyword i  from campaign j  during time 
period t . 
ijtCTR  Click-through-rate of keyword i  from campaign j  during time period t
, dependent on position
ijtPOS . See Equation 4-2.  


jn
i
ijtQ
1
 
Total volume of searches from all keywords in campaign j during time 
period t . 

 
m
j
n
i
ijt
j
Q
1 1
 
Total volume of searches from all keywords at the account level during 
time period t . 
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

jn
i
ijtCOST
1
 
The total cost of all keywords in campaign j  during time period t . 

 
m
j
n
i
ijt
j
COST
1 1
 
The total cost of all keywords at the account level during time period t . 


jn
i
ijtCLICKS
1
 
Total clicks of all keywords in campaign j  during time period t . 

 
m
j
n
i
ijt
j
CLICKS
1 1
 
The total clicks of all keywords at the account level during time period
t . 
 
I consider a single advertiser with m campaigns and jn keywords in each campaign j , 
where each campaign is defined as one of the four buying funnel segments for simplicity (i.e., m
= 4 in the simulation demonstrated in this thesis). Each campaign j  contains specific keywords 
from a stage of the buying funnel model; 1 represents Awareness, 2 Research, 3 Decision, and 4 
Purchase. Furthermore, each campaign is defined to represent a single ad group. In other words, 
the budget hierarchy is defined from an account level to a campaign level, and from a campaign 
level to individual keywords, as shown with notation in Table 4-3 and in an AdWords account in 
Figure A-3. 
Table 4-3 The account hierarchy and budget setting options with notation 
ACCOUNT 
BUDGET tB  
CAMPAIGN 1 
C1: AWARENESS 
CAMPAIGN 2 
C2: RESEARCH 
CAMPAIGN 3 
C3: DECISION 
CAMPAIGN 4 
C4: PURCHASE 
ktC1  ktC2  ktC3  ktC4  
Keywords 
1,...,2,1 ni   
Keywords 
2,...,2,1 ni   
Keywords 
3,...,2,1 ni   
Keywords 
4,...,2,1 ni   
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The company’s daily budget ( tB ) is allocated to the four campaigns using the four allocation 
strategies as depicted in Table 4-4 (the model is generalizable to any number of campaigns). In 
addition, the time period t  can be set at any level of granularity, such as a week, a day, or an hour. 
However, considering the current state of search advertising platforms, advertisers typically set a 
daily budget on a monthly basis, and are limited in the number of times budgets can be adjusted 
during a day. Therefore, to follow the practice and for ease of modeling and understanding, t  
represents a day, and the simulation model is run for a planning horizon of 30 days (one month). 
This is illustrated in Table 4-4 for each allocation strategy.  
The segmentation of keywords based on the stages of the buying funnel model allows companies 
to create or modify different compositions of keywords (number of keywords in each stage), track 
and prioritize the performance of multiple marketing objectives (generate “awareness”, introduce 
consumers conducting “research” to its product/service offerings, persuade “decisions” when 
comparing brands, and increase “purchase” conversions), and determine how each keyword type 
effects budget utilization. In addition, the segmentation of keywords using the buying funnel 
provides companies with the ability to identify, within the context of a marketing objective, why 
certain types of keywords offer different value and vary in competitiveness, and decide if higher 
or lower budget should be allocated or if keywords should be added or removed. is intended to 
illustrate the analysis and presentation of the simulation model. It shows a 4 x 4 grid where each 
column represents an allocation strategy and each row represents a campaign. For each column, 
the sum of the rows equals the account level budget ( tB ). 
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Table 4-4 Budget Allocation Strategies 
jk tC : AMOUNT OF BUDGET ALLOCATED to campaign j using allocation strategy k  
during time period t , where 4,3,2,1j ; 4,3,2,1k ; 30,...,2,1t , and BUDGET= tB  
 ALLOCATION STRATEGY 
CAMPAIGN Baseline 
1k  
Cost-based 
2k  
Volume-based 
3k  
Clicks-based 
4k  
C1: AWARENESS 
1j  
(CAMPAIGN ONE) 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to C1 
using 
BASELINE 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to 
C1 using 
COST 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to C1 
using 
VOLUME 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to 
C1 using 
CLICKS 
C2: RESEARCH 
2j  
(CAMPAIGN TWO) 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to C2 
using 
BASELINE 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to 
C2 using 
COST 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to C2 
using 
VOLUME 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to 
C2 using 
CLICKS 
C3: DECISION 
3j  
(CAMPAIGN THREE) 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to C3 
using 
BASELINE 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to 
C3 using 
COST 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to C3 
using 
VOLUME 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to 
C3 using 
CLICKS 
C4: PURCHASE 
4j  
(CAMPAIGN FOUR) 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to C4 
using 
BASELINE 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to 
C4 using 
COST 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to C4 
using 
VOLUME 
Portion of 
BUDGET ($) 
allocated to 
C4 using 
CLICKS 
 
This thesis uses simulation modeling for three reasons. First, simulation modeling provides the 
analyst with the ability to recreate phenomenon and behaviour of interest for study (in this case, 
the sponsored search program of a single advertiser). Second, simulation provides the modeller 
with the flexibility to analyse multiple scenarios over time (i.e., different budget allocation 
strategies). As shown in Table 4-4, I conduct four experiments under four budget allocation 
strategies. Third, simulation allows statistics gathering through meaningful output and results that 
can be statistically validated (Ree, 2000). Taking this into account, it is important to ensure that 
the system does in fact reflect the reality and is validated through testing. The process that is 
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captured in the simulation is shown conceptually in Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2. I specifically used 
ARENA® 14 simulation software for model development. 
 
Figure 4-1 Input classification 
  
C1 AWARENESS
C2 RESEARCH
C3 DECISION
C4 PURCHASE
Buying Funnel Model
Input
Keywords
Number of 
Advertisers
Position
CPC
Daily 
Search 
Volume
Keyword 
Term
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Figure 4-2 Conceptual framework of the simulation model 
Input
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AWARENESS
Project 
Daily 
Volume
Project 
Position
Calculate CTR
Determine if 
keyword is 
clicked
Calculate total 
daily cost, 
volume and 
clicks
Decide campaign 
budget amount using an 
allocation strategy for the 
next time period 
C4 
PURCHASE
Project 
Daily 
Volume
Project 
Position
Calculate CTR
Determine if 
keyword is 
clicked
Calculate total 
daily cost, 
volume and 
clicks
C3 
DECISION
Project 
Daily 
Volume
Project 
Position
Calculate CTR
Determine if 
keyword is 
clicked
Calculate total 
daily cost, 
volume and 
clicks
C2 
RESEARCH
Project 
Daily 
Volume
Project 
Position
Calculate CTR
Determine if 
keyword is 
clicked
Calculate total 
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volume and 
clicks
t+1
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CPC
Determine 
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Determine 
CPC
Determine 
CPC
P a g e  | 41 
 
The amount of budget allocated to campaign j  during time period t  using a given allocation 
strategy is shown in Equation 4-1 below. The amount of budget allocated ( jk tC ) equals the 
allocation proportion ( jk t ) multiplied by the total account level budget ( tB ). The allocation 
proportion ( jk t ) represents the ratio of a campaign’s total outcome of volume, cost, or clicks to 
the corresponding total outcome at the account level from 1t . 
Equation 4-1 Amount of budget allocated to campaign j  using an allocation strategy k  
tjk tjk t BC   , for 4,3,2,1j ; 4,3,2,1k ; and 30,...,2,1t . 
For the Baseline allocation strategy, 
4
1
1 tj , and ttj BC  4
1
1 ; 
For the Cost-based allocation strategy, 


 




4
1 1
1
1
1
2
j
n
i
ijt
n
i
ijt
tj
j
j
COST
COST
 , and; 
For the Volume-based allocation strategy, 


 




4
1 1
1
1
1
3
j
n
i
ijt
n
i
ijt
tj
j
j
Q
Q
 , and; 
 For the Clicks-based allocation strategy, 


 




4
1 1
1
1
1
4
j
n
i
ijt
n
i
ijt
tj
j
j
CLICKS
CLICKS
 . 
The search volumes, positions, and CPCs of each keyword are determined using a triangular 
distribution, with minimum, expected, and maximum values from the SpyFu data. The triangular 
distribution is chosen for its flexibility in approximating the historical data. Instead of relying on 
one single parameter such as average, the triangular distribution allows the use of the minimum, 
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most likely, and maximum values of a given variable to approximate its distribution based on 
historical data. The input parameters specifically used for search volume are based on a minimum 
of one, and expected and maximum values of the “exact global daily search volumes” for each 
keyword from the SpyFu data. The position of a keyword is determined using the theoretical 
minimum position of one as the minimum, and expected and maximum positions based on the 
historical average position and the number of competing advertisers, respectively, from the SpyFu 
data. To determine CPC, the “broad cost per click”, “phrase cost per click” and “exact cost per 
click” values from the SpyFu data are ordered from lowest to highest and used to represent 
minimum, expected, and maximum values in the triangular distribution. According to previous 
empirical studies, the top ranked position generates the largest CTR. The CTR for positions below 
the first are monotone and decreasing in value (Chitika, 2013; Ghose & Yang, 2009). Considering 
this, and to capture the decay in clicks as position increases, ijtCTR  is formulated in the simulation 
model using the Zipf distribution (Balakrishnana & Kambhampati, 2008; Naldi et al., 2010; 
Regelson & Fain, 2006; and Xie and O’Hallaron, 2002).  Equation 4-2 shows this formulation 
which represents the probability a user clicks the ad of keyword i  from campaign j  during time 
period t . The effects of different rate of decay values 2,5.1,1 or are shown in Figure 4-3. The 
higher the value of  , the faster the decay. 
Equation 4-2 Click through rate of keyword i  from campaign j  during time period t  
 ijt
ijt
POS
CTR
1
 , where the rate of decay of ijtCTR is tested at 2,5.1,1 or . 
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Figure 4-3 The rate of decay of CTR using different   values 
The performance implications of each allocation strategy is assessed based on two direct measures, 
budget overage/underage ( jk tDEV ) and budget absolute deviation ( jk tABSDEV ). First, I use the 
budget overage/underage at the campaign level. According to keyword auction rules, once the 
daily budget runs out, ads are not shown for the remainder of the day. Thus, advertisers miss 
opportunities due to the shortage of budget and jk tDEV  would be a negative value (underage). 
Alternatively, if the daily budget is left unutilized, it represents poor budget allocation or 
ineffective campaign or keyword performance, and jk tDEV  would be a positive value (overage). 
In particular, at campaign levels, poor allocation is characterized by budget overage in some 
campaigns and budget underage in other campaigns. Thus, I track this performance for the different 
allocation strategies. Equation 4-3 measures this performance at the campaign level, which is 
calculated by subtracting the total cost spent for campaign j  from the amount of budget allocated 
to it. 
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Equation 4-3 Overage/underage in dollars of campaign j  and strategy k  during time 
period t  



jn
i
ijtjktjkt COSTCDEV
1
, for 4,3,2,1j , 4,3,2,1k , and 30,...,2,1t . 
To show the relative efficiency of each allocation strategy, I also calculate the percent 
overage/underage of each campaign at the end of each time period. This percentage is calculated 
by dividing the overage/underage of campaign j  by the amount of budget allocated to it. Finally, 
the overall efficiency of each strategy k  and campaign j  for all 30 days is calculated by taking the 
average of the percent overage/underage across the planning horizon. An example is shown 
graphically in Figure 4-4. 
 
Figure 4-4 Example of average percent overage/underage by segment 
Furthermore, to assess the variance in dollars from the allocated budgets at the campaign 
level, I report the absolute value of the overage/underage for each campaign and allocation 
strategy, as shown in Equation 4-4. 
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Equation 4-4 Absolute deviation in dollars of campaign j  and strategy k  during time 
period t  
jktjkt DEVABSDEV  , for 4,3,2,1j , 4,3,2,1k , and 30,...,2,1t . 
To assess the impact of each allocation strategy across the duration of the planning horizon (i.e., 
30 days), I report the average of the absolute deviation for 30 days. Furthermore, I calculate the 
total overage/underage across the entire account. This is simply the sum of the average absolute 
deviations from all campaigns which is used to compare the overall efficiency of the allocation 
strategies as shown in Figure 4-5. 
 
Figure 4-5 Example of total average absolute deviation 
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 Experimental Setting 
5.1 Data 
Before selecting the sample cases used for the simulation, keyword advertising data from 76 
companies spanning 16 industries, as defined by Bloomberg (2015), was first collected during the 
month of May 2015 from Spyfu.com, a leading provider of keyword research technology and 
competitive intelligence to search engine advertisers (Ayanso & Karimi, 2015) (See Table A-1 in 
the appendix). Many major companies use SpyFu, and it has been endorsed by major media outlets 
such as Forbes, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal (SpyFu, 2015). Bloomberg 
(2015) lists 49 distinct industries. Many of these industries (e.g., mining, Aerospace, or Defence) 
do not use sponsored search advertising, thus they were not chosen for comparisons. Of the 49 
industries, 16 were chosen (shown in Table 5-2) for cross-industry comparisons and for selecting 
sample companies for the simulation and detailed analysis. The files obtained from Spyfu.com for 
each company contain a domain’s keywords, the URL it is linked to, its position, exact local and 
exact global daily searches, broad, phrase, and exact cost per click, clicks per day, and cost per 
day values. Full description of each measure is given in Table A-2 in the appendix.  
Google provides three different keyword match types for advertisers to select from: 
“Broad” (the default setting in AdWords and the widest casting net), “Phrase”, and “Exact” (the 
most specific and smallest casting net). Each match type has an impact on the number of similar 
keywords an advertiser’s ad can possibly be linked to for a single keyword bid in a campaign. This 
directly impacts the average CPC due to varying CPCs for every variation of a keyword. Table 4-1 
shows Google’s definition of each match type with examples. All tree match types are used in this 
thesis. 
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Table 5-1 Match type definitions according to Google 
Match type Special symbol Example keyword Ads may show on searches that Example searches
Broad match none women's hats include misspellings, synonyms, related 
searches, and other relevant variations
buy ladies hats
Broad match modifier +keyword +women's +hats contain the modified term (or close 
variations, but not synonyms), in any 
order
hats for women
Phrase match "keyword" "women's hats" are a phrase, and close variations of 
that phrase
buy women's hats
Exact match [keyword] [women's hats] are an exact term and close variations 
of that exact term
women's hats
Negative match -keyword -women are searches without the term baseball hats
 
5.2 Data Pre-processing 
The keyword advertising data was initially pre-processed to ensure the quality of the input data. 
Of the 76 companies, five were found to have corrupted records that were removed before 
aggregate statistics were obtained. The remaining records represent the output from Google’s 
keyword planner tool with an average target position of 2. Thus, values of zero for measures of 
cost per click and search volume were acceptable. However, prior to segmenting the keywords 
into the buying funnel, additional records were removed. Any record with global search volumes 
of less than one or broad cost per click values equal to zero was removed. There were no values 
below zero for broad cost per click. These records were removed due to the simulation model’s 
input data specifications. Specifically, as global search volume is used as input for the number of 
searches in the model and a searcher is defined as an entity, a value below one or non-integer value 
is invalid. Moreover, using keyword records with CPC values of zero does not make sense. Thus, 
the broad cost per click variable must be greater than zero. Once the records were segmented into 
the buying funnel, the distributions of global exact volume and broad cost per click were visualized 
by segment, and any outliers were removed. The CPC values by match type do not follow a 
sequential pattern where Broad CPCs can be said to be less than or greater than Phrase or Exact 
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CPCs consistently. Therefore, the results were ordered sequentially by actual values instead of 
match type in order to set minimum CPC, expected CPC, and maximum CPC values for the 
triangular distribution. 
5.3 Sampling  
In order to examine detailed profiles of the companies in each industry, the top five companies in 
terms of market share from each of the 16 industries were used if they were found to be actively 
advertising on Google’s AdWords platform (SpyFu had competitive keyword data available). This 
resulted in some industries with fewer than five observations. Additionally, in some cases, 
Bloomberg lists conglomerates and parent companies (e.g., ACCOR SA) that do not sell products 
or services. In the latter case, if a subsidiary company was found to be advertising, it is used to 
represent the parent company. 
Table 5-2 Sixteen industries and the top companies by market share 
 
INDUSTRY COMPANY NAME URL
Airlines United Continental Holdings United.com
Apparel, Footwear, Acc Design Nike Inc. nike.com
Automobile OEM Toyota Motor Corp toyota.com
Banking Bank of America Corp bankofamerica.com
Beverages Coca-Cola Co/The coca-colacompany.com
Computer Hardware Lenovo Group Ltd lenovo.com
Department Stores Macy's Inc macys.com
IT Services International Business Machines ibm.com
Internet Media Google Inc google.com
Life Insurance Prudential Financial Inc prudential.com
Lodging Accor SA novotel.com
Mass Merchants Wal-Mart Stores Inc walmart.com
Restaurants Starbucks Corp starbucks.com
Retail Discretionary Home Depot Inc/The homedepot.com
Software Microsoft Corp microsoft.com
Telecom Carriers AT&T Inc att.com
P a g e  | 49 
 
After examining the profiles of the companies in each industry, four industries were 
selected to represent the final sample. The four industries selected for keyword classification and 
for the simulation model are Airlines, Computer Hardware, Department Stores, and Life Insurance. 
Each industry was selected based on its distinct product/service offerings, relevance to searchers 
(most searchers are likely to have purchased from one, if not all the industries), and different 
expected advertising goal orientations as defined by the buying funnel. This is done to demonstrate 
the applicability of different budget allocation methods in different industries. For example, prior 
work has investigated insurance keywords (Goldfarb & Tucker, 2011b) and has shown that the 
keywords are mostly in the “awareness” and “research” categories of the buying funnel. Computer 
hardware was chosen because of the high possibility of “decision” and “purchase” oriented 
keywords related to specific product model names and numbers and the high volume of cross-
product or cross-model comparisons. Department stores were chosen because of the broad 
selection of products they carry and their large brick and mortar presence. Additionally, given the 
amount and variety of products department stores carry (from convenience goods to luxury), their 
keyword portfolios are more likely to form the buying funnel. Finally, the airlines industry was 
chosen because most sales occur online and high level of competitions are expected depending on 
the markets or locations. The top company by market share is selected from each of these four 
industries. These companies are Lenovo from the Computer and Hardware industry, Macy’s from 
Department Store industry, Prudential from the Life Insurance industry, and United Continental 
Holdings from the Airline industry. Although these companies have top market share and financial 
performance, inefficiencies in keyword advertising may still occur. However, these companies 
provide richer keyword data pool to demonstrate the proposed budget allocation strategies. Being 
the top performing companies in their industries, competing companies would try to emulate 
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similar business and marketing strategies, manufacture or sell similar products, and therefore bid 
on subsets of similar keywords. This competition provides a more appropriate setting for 
comparisons and further data analyses. 
For each company, a random sample of 1000 keywords were selected and classified into 
the buying funnel model using the keyword classification schema proposed by Jansen and 
Schuster’s (2011) as shown in Table 5-3 below. Example keywords by each stage of the buying 
funnel are shown in Table 5-4 for each of the four companies. 
Table 5-3 Classification Schema 
Awareness:
 Does not contain a brand name
 Could contain partial product name/type
 Could contain problem to be solved
 Could contain, gift certificate amount, generic 
company special, or generic company code
Research
 Does not contain brand name
 Contains specific product
Decision
 Contains specific product and partial brand 
name
 Does not contain full brand/company
Purchase
 Contains specific product and full brand 
name/company  
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Table 5-4 Example keywords classified according to the buying funnel 
AWARENESS RESEARCH DECISION PURCHASE
laptops sale discount laptops for 
students
battery lenovo lenovo ideapad y530 
battery
labtop thin laptop computers thinkpad x series lenovo thinkpad x120e
laptop best best high performance 
laptops
lenovo charger lenovo ac adapter 65w 
20v
AWARENESS RESEARCH DECISION PURCHASE
elegant plates top rated rice cooker melior coffee press krups b100 beertender
men gold watch 24k gold watch mens diesel watch bulova men s marine star 
watch
cologne fragrance best deodorant and 
antiperspirant for women
mori perfume christian dior addict
AWARENESS RESEARCH DECISION PURCHASE
401 retirement 401k direct rollover prudential investment bank of america wealth 
management banking
whats an annuity pension and annuity 
income
ing annuties the hartford variable 
annuity
life insurance search affordable term life life insurance fidelity suze orman whole life 
insurance
AWARENESS RESEARCH DECISION PURCHASE
fly to florida cheap florida airfare disney florida package disney world orlando 
florida tickets
is travel to cancun safe cheap flight to cancun barcelo los cabos resort riu caribe all inclusive 
cancun
one way airline ticket airfares hawaii hawaiian airlines 
international flights
hawaiian airline 
reservation
MACY'S
PRUDENTIAL
LENOVO
UNITED CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS
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A summary of the input data and the final count results of the classification by stage are 
shown in Figure 5-1, where each campaign represents a stage of the buying funnel. The campaigns 
are ordered sequentially according to the stages of the buying funnel. C1 represents “awareness” 
keywords, C2, “research”, C3, “decision”, and C4, “purchase” keywords. 
  
  
Figure 5-1 Keyword counts by campaign for each company 
With the exception of Prudential, where there is more “research” keywords than any other, 
each company’s number of keywords follow the funnel shape, where most keywords are 
“awareness”, and the number of keywords diminishing from “awareness” to “research”, “research” 
to “decision”, and from “decision” to “purchase”. Nevertheless, the funnel shapes vary for these 
example companies. Macy’s has a near perfect funnel shape. Lenovo’s funnel is the second most 
balanced with over one third of the keywords in the latter stages of the funnel and almost similar 
number of “research” and “decision” keywords. United Continental Holdings has a heavily skewed 
funnel with 96 percent of the keywords belonging to either “awareness” (57%) or “research” 
(39%). 
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 Table A-3 in the appendix presents the descriptive statistics of the keyword data for the 
four example companies. Lenovo has the highest average volume at 18.71, but the lowest average 
position and average number of advertisers (i.e., indicator of the degree of keyword competition), 
with values of 5.19 and 11.58, respectively. This is in contrast to United Continental Holdings, 
whose average volume is the lowest at 7.51; average position is the second highest at 7.53; and 
average number of advertisers is the highest at 17.09. Prudential has the highest average CPCs. 
Summary statistics are also shown by campaign/segment for average volume in Figure 5-2, CPC 
in Figure 5-3, position in Figure 5-4, number of advertisers in Figure 5-5, and combined results in 
Table A-4 in the appendix. 
 
Figure 5-2 Average volume by segment  
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Figure 5-3 Average cost per click by segment 
 
 
Figure 5-4 Average position by segment 
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Figure 5-5 Average number of advertisers by segment 
 
5.4 Performance Measures 
I conducted four simulation experiments, one for each company (Lenovo, Macy’s, Prudential, and 
United Continental Holdings). Prior to the experiments, the companies’ keywords were segmented 
into one of four campaigns, with each campaign representing a stage of the buying funnel for 
simplicity. To demonstrate the benefits of the allocation strategies, I compare them with a baseline 
strategy. The Baseline allocation strategy is a commonly used strategy in practice and is also used 
in prior literature for similar purpose (Yang et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2014). 
For example, in Zhang et al. (2012), the advertising budget (search market or account level) is 
fixed and spread equally to all campaigns and is not changed from day to day. In practice, 
advertisers employ this method due to its simplicity, or possibly from a lack of decision support 
tools to apply more systematic allocation methods. The second strategy is Cost-based where the 
amount of advertising budget allocated to a campaign is determined by that campaign’s cost in 
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proportion to the total cost spent for all campaigns during the previous time period. The third 
strategy is Volume-Based. The advertising budget is allocated to campaigns based on the amount 
of volume a campaign generated in proportion to the total volume generated across all campaigns 
during the previous time period. Finally, the fourth allocation strategy is Clicks-based, and the 
advertising budget is allocated to a campaign based on the campaign’s click performance in 
proportion to the total clicks for all campaigns during the previous time period. 
In order to understand the performance of an allocation strategy, the actual costs spent 
against the allocated budget are tracked and the budget overage or underage are computed for each 
campaign during each time period (see Equation 4.3 and Equation 4.4). Corresponding results in 
percent overage/underage are also reported. For each campaign, an average absolute 
overage/underage value is computed for a 30-day planning horizon. In addition, to capture the 
overall performance of an allocation strategy, the sum of the average absolute overage/underage 
values of the four campaigns is used. This represents the overall performance of each allocation 
strategy, which is then compared to the performance using the Baseline strategy. Examples of 
overage/underage values in dollars for the four campaigns over a 30-day planning horizon are 
shown in Figure 5-6 and the corresponding results in percent overage/underage are shown in 
Figure 5-7. 
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Figure 5-6 Example overage/underage in dollars ($) over a 30 day period 
 
  
  
Figure 5-7 Example percent overage/underage over a 30 day period 
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Performance is defined as the total average absolute deviation of an allocation strategy, 
where the lower the value (closer to zero), the better the strategy. These results are used in 
conjunction with the graphical representation of the percent overage/underage by campaign for 
each allocation strategy compared to the Baseline. A company’s estimated budget value is 
determined by multiplying the broad clicks per time period by the broad CPC and dividing this 
number by the number of keywords in the file. This value is then multiplied by the number of 
keywords included in the final simulation input file. Equation 5-1 shows this estimation. 
Equation 5-1 Estimated budget 
simulationin  Keywords of#
Keywords of # Total
CPC BroadClicks Broad


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 Simulation Results 
For each sample company, I profile and compare the outcome of the simulation experiments under 
each allocation strategy with that of the baseline strategy. First, I present the outcome of total cost, 
volume, clicks, and the number of keywords, and each campaign’s profile in each. Second, I show 
performance as the total average absolute deviation by allocation strategy and the average 
percentage of overage/underage by campaign.  
6.1 Simulation Cases 
6.1.1 Case-1: Lenovo 
The classification of Lenovo’s keywords in the buying funnel presents some interesting outcomes. 
As expected, relative to the other companies, there is more focus on the latter stages of the buying 
funnel (37%). It is a well-established brand, and the products it carries vary across the product 
development life cycle with new models of laptops and tablets (sometimes entire product 
categories) introduced on an annual basis similar to the automotive industry. Due to the expensive 
nature of its products, the flow-through stages of the buying funnel are expected to be slower, as 
laptops are longer term purchase decisions. For this reason as well as because of the high tech and 
oligopolistic nature of the Computer hardware industry, Lenovo is present in all stages of the 
buying funnel. The earlier stages of keywords, where there is more competition (see Figure 5-5), 
focus on the introduction and explanation of new types of products, in addition to promotions such 
as “cheapest laptops online” and “cheap laptops for college students. The decision stage is focussed 
on the brand, “laptops lenovo”, product categories, “lenovo thinkpad reviews”, and its accessories, 
“lenovo batteries”. Finally, in the “purchase” stage, the majority of the keywords are for specific 
models such as, “lenovo thinkpad x120e”. 
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Figure 6-1 Lenovo’s average contribution of cost, volume, clicks and keywords by segment 
The percent contribution of each segment to total cost, volume, clicks, and the number of 
keywords, along with the corresponding totals, is shown for Lenovo in Figure 6-1. From the figure, 
the following can be observed: (i) the outcomes of each measure do not match the percentage 
contribution of the number of keywords. As expected, due to the varying CPCs and average 
positions, some campaigns contribute more or less to a measure’s total, (ii)  of particular note is 
Lenovo’s “decision” and “purchase” keywords represent only 37 percent of all keywords, 40 
percent of the cost, and 41 percent of the volume, but generate a much higher percentage of clicks 
(57%). This is caused by lower average CPCs and positions Lenovo attains in these two segments, 
(iii) this is in contrast to “awareness” keywords which represent 40 percent of the keywords, but 
generate a higher percentage of cost (50%) and a lower percentage of clicks (37%), (iv) “Research” 
keywords are the poorest contributors to total clicks with only 6 percent. This is caused by higher 
average CPCs and Positions, in addition to lower average volumes in this segment. With little 
contribution to overall cost, volume, or clicks, more research keywords are required to restore the 
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funnel shape. However, the disparity in percent contribution of cost (11%) and clicks (6%) would 
suggest that in terms of click generation, “research” keywords are poor investment, (v) on the other 
hand, “purchase” keywords with low cost contribution (11%) and high click contribution (20%) 
would be a good investment. (vi) for a click maximization strategy, Lenovo should invest in more 
“decision” and “purchase” keywords. Surprisingly, in terms of exposure, “purchase” keywords 
provide the most volume (16%), while contributing the smallest cost (11%). 
 
Figure 6-2 Lenovo’s total average absolute deviation in dollars ($) 
The total average absolute deviation of all four strategies is shown for Lenovo in Figure 
6-2. From the figure, the following can be observed: (i) all allocation strategies significantly 
outperform the Baseline. This suggests that by using the buying funnel and any of these simple 
allocation strategies, Lenovo can achieve better budget utilization, (ii) the Cost-based strategy 
performed the best overall and is nearly seven times better than the baseline, (iii) the Clicks-based 
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strategy performed the poorest of all the proposed strategies, but is still twice as efficient as the 
Baseline.  
 
Figure 6-3 Lenovo’s average percent overage/underage by segment 
Lenovo’s average percent overage/underage by segment is shown in Figure 6-3. From the 
figure, the following can be observed: (i) in all cases, except campaign two using the Clicks-based 
strategy, the proposed allocation strategies outperform the baseline, (ii) with the current keywords, 
more budget is needed for campaign one for all allocation strategies, (iii) the results clearly show 
that the Cost-based strategy is best able to allocate the funds and that about 10 percent increase in 
budget is required to not exceed budget across all campaigns, (iv) due to the disparity between 
percent of total cost (11%) and percent of total clicks (6%) for “research” keywords, there is a 
large misallocation in campaign two using the Clicks-based strategy.  
  
P a g e  | 63 
 
6.1.2 Case-2: Macy’s 
As expected, the classification of Macy’s keywords resulted in close to the funnel shape. As a large 
department store, Macy’s carries a vast array of products varying across the product development 
life cycle and in purchase intensity (e.g., “men's footwear” or “womens underwear for men” and 
“14k pearl necklace”). As a consequence of this extreme variety, Macy’s invests heavily in 
sponsored search with a monthly budget of 2.33 million across 678,000 keywords. For the majority 
of its products, search users likely transition through the cognitive stages of the buying funnel 
rapidly. Thus, making it important that Macy’s is present at each stage to inform the searcher that 
it provides or carries the information or products they seek. Macy’s “awareness” keywords reflect 
the necessity of the broad net that it must cast, with keywords such as “holiday top”, “room couch”, 
and “cool mens clothes”. This logic follows through each stage, with “research” keywords such 
as, “sleeveless tops for women”, “chrome wall mirror”, and “professional makeup brush”, 
“decision” keywords such as, “jessica simpson denim”, “adidas polo shirts”, and “clayton marcus 
sectional”, and finally, “purchase” keywords such as “conair illumina lighted makeup mirror”, 
“lebron james 3 shoes”, and “krups b100 beertender”. 
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Figure 6-4 Macy’s average contribution of cost, volume, clicks and keywords by segment 
The percent contribution of each segment to total cost, volume, clicks, and the number of 
keywords, along with the corresponding totals, is shown for Macy’s in Figure 6-4. From the figure, 
the following can be observed: (i) “Awareness” keywords contribute the most across all measures. 
However, the cost contribution (67%) is larger than the contributions to volume (64%) and clicks 
(60%), suggesting that “awareness” keywords are a poor investment in terms of volume or clicks 
per dollar relative to the other segments, (ii)  the most productive keywords in terms of clicks and 
volume are “purchase” keywords. While only contributing three percent of the total cost, 
“purchase” keywords account for nearly double that, for both volume (5%) and clicks (6%), (iii) 
“Decision” keywords are the only keywords that contribute lower costs (18%), but provide more 
clicks (22%) than its percentage of keywords (20%). 
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Figure 6-5 Macy’s total average absolute deviation in dollars ($) 
The total average absolute deviation of all four allocation strategies is shown for Macy’s 
in Figure 6-5. From the figure, the following can be observed: (i) all allocation strategies 
significantly outperform the Baseline. This suggests that by using the buying funnel and any of 
these simple allocation strategies, Macy’s can reduce the opportunity costs of overage/underage 
resulting from poor allocation, (ii) the Cost-based and Volume-based strategies performed the best 
overall and the Clicks-based strategy performed slightly worse, (iii) the Baseline strategy has the 
poorest performance, and at $1,215.24 total average absolute deviation, it is over 12 times worse 
than the Cost-based and Volume-based strategies. 
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Figure 6-6 Macy’s average percent overage/underage by segment 
Macy’s average percent overage/underage by segment is shown in Figure 6-6. From the 
figure, the following can be observed: (i) in all cases, the Baseline allocation strategy is 
outperformed, (ii) in this instance, the choice between the Cost-based and Volume-based allocation 
strategies is not straightforward. Using the Cost-based allocation strategy, there is consistent over-
allocation of about 6%, and a reduction to the overall account budget of that amount would bring 
it closer to zero overage/underage in all campaigns. On the other hand, the Volume-based strategy 
performs better on the most expensive segments, “awareness” (3%) and “decision” (-1%), but 
poorer in the less expensive segments, “research” (22%) and “purchase” (33%). Due to the one 
percent underage observed for “research” keywords using the Volume-based strategy, there is 
potential lost opportunity. Therefore, the Cost-based strategy is the best strategy, as it has lowest 
average overage/underage value in all segments, (iii) the baseline strategy is unable to account for 
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the variation in costs of the segments, and is severely under-budgeted for “awareness” and over 
budgeted for the three other segments. 
6.1.3 Case-3: Prudential 
As Goldfarb & Tucker (2011) suggested, the emphasis of Prudential’s sponsored search initiative 
is in “research” and “awareness” stages, with 57 percent and 31 percent of its keywords, 
respectively. This is not surprising given the nature of the life insurance industry, with products 
and services that are invested in over extended periods of time, and high involvement purchase 
decisions. Additionally, the highly personal nature of life insurance products and services, and the 
individual level customization of terms, conditions, and policies make it difficult to select 
“purchase” or final conversion keywords. Of particular note is the power of the buying funnel in 
showcasing the differences in CPCs (see Figure 6-7) and the high intensity of competition in the 
research stage as shown in Section 5.4, where there is a low average CPC of $4.35 for “awareness” 
keywords and a high of $11.07 for “research” keywords. The types of keywords in the “awareness” 
stage are related to financial and life insurance queries such as “pension planning”, “retirement 
and financial planning”, and “advice on life insurance”. Prudential’s “research” keywords are also 
heavily focused on financial and life insurance questions such as “whole life vs term life 
insurance”, “asset liability management insurance, and “single premium annuity calculator”. Its 
“decision keywords are focussed on competitors’ services and promotion of its own, with 
keywords such as, “north carolina mutual life insurance company”, “hartford retirement services”, 
and “prudential life insurance quote”. Finally, Prudential’s “purchase” keywords mostly target 
competitor’s specific products and services such as, “rollover 401k to roth”, “metlife investors 
variable annuity”, and “the hartford variable annuity”.  
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Figure 6-7 Prudential’s average CPCs 
 
 
Figure 6-8 Prudential’s average contribution of cost, volume, clicks and keywords by 
segment 
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The percent contribution of each segment to total cost, volume, clicks, and the number of 
keywords, along with the corresponding totals, is shown for Prudential in Figure 6-8. From the 
figure, the following can be observed: (i) “Awareness” keywords offer the greatest value in terms 
of cost, volume, and clicks. While contributing 43 percent of the total cost, they account for a 
higher percentage of total volume (53%) and total clicks (58%), (ii) the “decision” and “purchase” 
keywords contribute far less than “awareness” and “research” keywords across all measures, (iii) 
Prudential has invested heavily in the number of “research” keywords (56%), but they only provide 
28 percent of total clicks and contribute the most cost (44%). A possible explanation for 
Prudential’s large investment in research keywords is that they lead to the most valuable 
conversions. 
 
Figure 6-9 Prudential’s total average absolute deviation in dollars ($) 
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The total average absolute deviation is shown for Prudential in Figure 6-9. From the figure, 
the following can be observed: (i) at the expected budget, each allocation strategy has a large total 
average absolute deviation, (ii) however, the proposed allocation strategies still outperform the 
Baseline with roughly 60 percent the total average absolute deviation,  (iii) the Volume-based and 
Clicks-based strategies are second and third best options, respectively, (iv) a reduction in budget 
would produce lower values. 
 
Figure 6-10 Prudential’s average percent overage/underage by segment 
Prudential’s average percent overage/underage by segment is shown in Figure 6-10. From 
the figure, the following can be observed: (i) by using the Cost-based allocation strategy, the 
budget is consistently about 29% higher and a reduction of this percent to the total account budget 
would bring the deviation closer to zero, (ii) the Volume-based strategy resulted in a shortage of 
budget for “purchase” keywords. This is due to the low average volume of 4.57 and high CPCs of 
$9.54 of the “purchase” keywords relative to the other keywords as shown in Figure 5-2 and Figure 
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5-3, (iii) the Baseline strategy outperforms all proposed allocation strategies on “awareness” 
keywords and shows better performance than the Cost-based strategy on “research” keywords, but 
is significantly over budgeted for the “decision” and “purchase” keywords, (iv) the Clicks-based 
allocation strategy resulted in the highest average percent overage/underage with “awareness” 
keywords and had an equal percent in campaign three. It is the only strategy at this budget level to 
have two campaigns (C2 and C4) under budgeted. 
6.1.4 Case-4: United Continental Holdings 
Interestingly, the classification of United Continental Holdings’ keywords resulted in a heavily 
skewed funnel shape with very little invested in the “decision” and “purchase” stages of the buying 
funnel (4% combined). This is possibly due to flights and airline travel being perceived as a 
commodity good, where most consumers are only interested in the price of travel and not 
differences in service quality or amenities. Considering this, the low investment in the latter stages 
of the buying funnel may also be driven by the nature of the airlines industry and ease of finding 
relevant information once on a travel agent website or airline website. Additionally, when entering 
a search term on Google such as “flight to …”, it provides the user with its’ own sponsored results 
in special windows in varying positions among the other advertisements as shown in Figure 6-11, 
as well as Figure A-1 and Figure A-2 in the appendix. This leads to a separate service at 
google.com/flights. The effect of this is highlighted by the diminishing level of volume observed 
in the latter stages of the buying funnel as shown in Figure 6-12. 
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Figure 6-11 Google’s search results for the term “flight to hanover” 
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Figure 6-12 United Continental Holdings’ average volume by segment 
United Continental Holdings’ “awareness” keywords are mostly a destination along with 
the mode of travel desired either for determining if it is available or to monitor the progress of a 
current flight such as “flights Jamaica”, “shuttle to sfo”, “new york to tel aviv flights”. Its 
“research” keywords mostly include terms that indicate intentions to find out more about the 
purchase of airfare such as, “vancouver flight deals”, “cheap flights san francisco to London”, and 
“cheapest airline to dubai”. United’s “decision” keywords are almost entirely focused on vacation 
packages such as, “disney vacations packages with airfare”, “apple vacations las vegas”, and “best 
disney world vacation packages”. Finally, its “purchase” keywords are full destination and specific 
vacation packages and a single product such as, “riu caribe all inclusive cancun”, “princess cruise 
tour Alaska”, and “united business credit card”. 
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Figure 6-13 United Continental Holdings’ average contribution of cost, volume, clicks and 
keywords by segment 
The percent contribution of each segment to total cost, volume, clicks, and the number of 
keywords, along with the corresponding totals, is shown for United Continental Holdings in Figure 
6-13. From the figure, the following can be observed: (i) “Decision” and “purchase” keywords 
contribute minimally to overall outcomes for all measures, (ii) “Awareness” keywords contribute 
more clicks (79%) than costs (72%) and account for more cost, volume, and clicks than percent of 
keywords (57%), (iii) this is in contrast to the “research” keywords, which account for more 
volume (26%) than cost (22%), and contribute less cost, volume, and clicks than the percent of 
keywords (39%). 
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Figure 6-14 United Continental Holdings’ total average absolute deviation in dollars ($) 
United Continental Holdings’ total average absolute deviation is shown in 
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Figure 6-14. From the figure, the following can be observed: (i) all allocation strategies 
significantly outperform the Baseline, (ii) Interestingly, the total average absolute deviation for 
both the Cost-based and Clicks-based strategies are identical, (iii) the Baseline strategy resulted in 
a total average absolute deviation equal to the budget. This is caused by the heavily skewed funnel 
with significant investments in both “awareness” and “research” and minimal investment in 
“decision” and “purchase”, (iii) The Volume-based strategy performed the poorest, but is still 
significantly more efficient at allocating budget as the Baseline. 
 
Figure 6-15 United Continental Holdings’ average percent overage/underage by segment 
United Continental Holdings’ average percent overage/underage by segment is shown in 
Figure 6-15. From the figure, the following can be observed: (i) the Baseline is outperformed in 
all cases, except for research keywords. The spread of budget equally across segments led to a 
budget overage of 219 percent on “awareness” keywords, and left 95 percent of “decision”, and 
97 percent of “purchase” campaigns’ budgets unutilized, (ii) of note is that the Cost-based strategy 
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has equal levels of underage for both “awareness” and “research” at five percent, but is 24 percent 
and 103 percent under-budgeted for “decision” and “purchase”, respectively. This disparity 
resulted from a small portion of the budget being allocated to these segments, with average 
overage/underage values of -$1.21 for “decision” and -$0.79 for “purchase”. This is also the case 
for the Volume and Clicks-based strategies, (iii) the Clicks-based strategy resulted in the same total 
average absolute deviation as the cost-based strategy, but it is better for campaign one and four. 
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6.2. Statistical Analysis 
In order to assess the simulation results, statistical tests were conducted. Specifically, I run paired 
t-tests to compare the total absolute deviations of each of the proposed allocation strategies to the 
Baseline strategy. Paired t-tests are used to compare the means of two populations when samples 
are correlated or matched pairs, or when it is a case-control study, and is therefore the best suited 
method for comparing the proposed allocation strategies to the Baseline strategy. The paired t-
tests are run using 3000 observations, from 100 replications of 30 days. The summary results are 
shown in the following sections and the raw output from SPPS® 20 is shown in Appendix B.  
6.2.1 Case 1: Lenovo 
As shown in the previous section, there were noted differences between the total average absolute 
deviation of each proposed allocation strategy and that of the baseline. In confirmation of the 
significance of each of these differences, I formulate the following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1-A: There is a significant difference between the Cost-based allocation strategy and 
the Baseline strategy in total absolute deviation in Lenovo’s case. 
Hypothesis 1-B: There is a significant difference between the Volume-based allocation strategy 
and the Baseline strategy in total absolute deviation in Lenovo’s case. 
Hypothesis 1-C: There is a significant difference between the Clicks-based allocation strategy and 
the Baseline strategy in total absolute deviation in Lenovo’s case. 
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Table 6-1 Case 1: Lenovo paired t-test results 
Pair 1
COST- 
BASELINE
-2598.7168 177.482942 3.2403804 -801.98 2999 0.000
Pair 2
VOLUME- 
BASELINE
-2225.43826 126.195125 2.3039972 -965.9 2999 0.000
Pair 3
CLICKS- 
BASELINE
-1387.70413 295.630354 5.3974471 -257.1 2999 0.000
LENOVO
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
 
As Table 6-1 above shows all three hypothesis 1-A, 1-B, and 1-C, are confirmed. Of note 
is that each is significantly different at the 99 percent confidence level. Therefore, in terms of total 
absolute deviation, each allocation strategy is statistically significantly better than the Baseline 
allocation strategy in Lenovo’s case.  
6.2.2 Case 2: Macy’s 
Similarly, there were noted differences for the total average absolute deviations in Macy’s case. In 
confirmation of the significance of each of these differences, I formulate the following three 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2-A: There is a significant difference between the Cost-based allocation strategy and 
the Baseline strategy in total absolute deviation in Macy’s case. 
Hypothesis 2-B: There is a significant difference between the Volume-based allocation strategy 
and the Baseline strategy in total absolute deviation in Macy’s case. 
Hypothesis 2-C: There is a significant difference between the Clicks-based allocation strategy and 
the Baseline strategy in total absolute deviation in Macy’s case. 
P a g e  | 80 
 
Table 6-2 Case 1: Macy’s paired t-test results 
Pair 1
COST- 
BASELINE
-1088.90045 104.603625 1.9097922 -570.17 2999 0.000
Pair 2
VOLUME- 
BASELINE
-1075.61683 89.4299984 1.6327609 -658.77 2999 0.000
Pair 3
CLICKS- 
BASELINE
-1029.95874 63.5116918 1.1595595 -888.23 2999 0.000
MACY'S
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
 
As Table 6-2 above shows all three hypothesis 2-A, 2-B, and 2-C, are confirmed. Of note 
is that each is significantly different at the 99 percent confidence level. Therefore, in terms of total 
absolute deviation, each allocation strategy is statistically significantly better than the Baseline 
allocation strategy in Macy’s case.  
6.2.3 Case 3: Prudential 
For Prudential, in confirmation of the significance of the differences between the allocation 
strategies and the baseline, I formulate the following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3-A: There is a significant difference between the Cost-based allocation strategy and 
the Baseline strategy in total absolute deviation in Prudential’s case. 
Hypothesis 3-B: There is a significant difference between the Volume-based allocation strategy 
and the Baseline strategy in total absolute deviation in Prudential’s case. 
Hypothesis 3-C: There is a significant difference between the Clicks-based allocation strategy and 
the Baseline strategy in total absolute deviation in Prudential’s case. 
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Table 6-3 Case 1: Prudential paired t-test results 
Pair 1
COST- 
BASELINE
-2161.9368 736.397822 13.444723 -160.8 2999 0.000
Pair 2
VOLUME- 
BASELINE
-1924.71571 746.980069 13.637928 -141.13 2999 0.000
Pair 3
CLICKS- 
BASELINE
-1511.24835 685.855634 12.521953 -120.69 2999 0.000
PRUDENTIAL
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
 
As Table 6-3 above shows all three hypothesis 3-A, 3-B, and 3-C, are confirmed. Of note 
is that each is significantly different at the 99 percent confidence level. Therefore, in terms of total 
absolute deviation, each allocation strategy is statistically significantly better than the Baseline 
allocation strategy in Prudential’s case. 
6.2.4 Case 4: United Continental Holdings 
Finally, for United Continental Holdings, in confirmation of the significance of the differences 
between the allocation strategies and the baseline, I formulate the following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4-A: There is a significant difference between the Cost-based allocation strategy and 
the Baseline strategy in total absolute deviation in United Continental Holdings’ case. 
Hypothesis 4-B: There is a significant difference between the Volume-based allocation strategy 
and the Baseline strategy in total absolute deviation in United Continental Holdings’ case. 
Hypothesis 4-C: There is a significant difference between the Clicks-based allocation strategy and 
the Baseline strategy in total absolute deviation in United Continental Holdings’ case. 
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Table 6-4 Case 1: United Continental Holdings paired t-test results 
Pair 1
COST- 
BASELINE
-1933.04272 90.7584468 1.657015 -1166.6 2999 0.000
Pair 2
VOLUME- 
BASELINE
-1851.9043 56.0287747 1.0229408 -1810.4 2999 0.000
Pair 3
CLICKS- 
BASELINE
-1928.69796 124.116937 2.2660549 -851.13 2999 0.000
UNITED
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
 
As Table 6-4 above shows all three hypothesis 4-A, 4-B, and 4-C, are confirmed. Of note 
is that each is significantly different at the 99 percent confidence level. Therefore, in terms of total 
absolute deviation each allocation strategy is statistically significantly better than the Baseline 
allocation strategy in United Continental Holdings’ case.  
The statistical test results clearly show that the proposed budget allocation heuristics 
significantly outperform the Baseline strategy. Therefore, the use of any of these allocation 
strategies, along with the segmentation of keywords as well as campaign organization into the 
buying funnel framework, improves advertiser’s overall budget utilization. Additional paired t-
tests were also conducted comparing each of the proposed performance-based allocation strategies 
to one another, and the results show significant differences (see Appendix B). These variations 
indicate the options advertisers have in performance-based allocation strategies, depending on 
their product/service contexts and marketing goal orientations.   
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  Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Overall, one major observation from the results of the simulation experiments for all allocation 
strategies is that they all consistently outperform the Baseline strategy in terms of total average 
absolute deviation. The Cost-based allocation strategy performs the best in all cases. The 
implication of this is that using historical information to inform the current time period leads to 
better performance than spreading the budget equally across all campaigns. Therefore, using past 
performance as an input potentially reduces an advertiser’s lost opportunity and inefficiency in 
budget utilization. The Cost-based strategy, as it is the measure that is directly related to budget 
spending, adapts to the changes in spending pattern of each campaign and is better able to allocate 
available funds. 
It is also important to highlight the interrelationships among the allocation strategies. For 
example, total cost of a campaign depends on the number of clicks and CPCs, and the number of 
clicks depends on the volume of searchers. These relationships are also affected by the company 
(industry it competes in), its inferred marketing strategy, and its product/service offerings. While 
the Cost-based strategy shows consistent performance across the segments (campaigns), it does 
not consistently outperform the other strategies in each campaign. Table 7-1 below summarizes 
the four cases, the four allocation strategies, as well as the findings and their implications. 
 Table 7-1 Summary of case findings and implications  
 Lenovo Macys Prudential United Continental 
Holdings 
Industry Computer Hardware 
 high tech and 
oligopolistic 
Department Stores 
 Competitive and 
majority brick and mortar 
presence  
Life Insurance 
 Highly competitive and 
a mixture of online and 
offline channels 
Airlines 
 Highly competitive with 
many online booking 
avenues 
Basic 
company 
profile 
 Well-established brand 
 Main products are 
laptops 
 Vast array of products 
 large department store 
with heavy brick and 
mortar presence 
 Many financial and life 
insurance products 
 Long term investments 
 
 Airline tickets varying 
in price and price 
elasticity  
 Middle of the pack 
service 
Product 
development 
life cycle 
 Expensive longer term 
purchase decisions 
 Products vary across the 
product development life 
cycle  
 New models of laptops 
and tablets (sometimes 
entire product categories) 
introduced on an annual 
basis 
 Large variety of 
products varying across 
the product development 
life cycle and in purchase 
intensity  
 Majority of products are 
low involvement 
purchases, such as, 
clothing and accessories  
 
 The product 
development life cycle 
does not apply unless it 
refers to the consumer and 
stage of life they are in.  
 Long term, high 
involvement purchase 
decisions 
 The product 
development life cycle 
does not apply to airline 
tickets. Tickets can be 
purchased at virtually any 
period of time from 
months in advance to day 
of.  
Inferred 
marketing 
strategy and 
focal stages 
Competitive and 
conversion based. Focused 
more on click 
maximization and 
consumer attention 
grabbing in the “decision” 
and “purchase” stages  
Generate awareness 
(volume focus) for both 
online and offline 
channels, with more 
emphasis on making 
consumers aware that 
products are available in 
the brick and mortar stores 
where the consumer can 
be cross- and up-sold  
Generate awareness and 
convince consumers to 
choose Prudential in the 
“research” stage 
Generate clicks and 
bookings through United’s 
reservation system 
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Buying funnel 
representative
ness 
Representative with more 
emphasis on the final 
stages, “decision” and 
“purchase” 
Representative with the 
general funnel shape.  
Not representative with 
emphasis on the 
“research” stage 
Somewhat representative 
with very little investment 
in the latter stages, 
“decision” and “purchase” 
Cost-based 
allocation 
strategy 
 Lowest total absolute 
deviation ($462.99) 
 Consistent underage of 
about 10 percent 
 Lowest total absolute 
deviation ($94.80) 
 Consistent overage of 
about six percent 
 Lowest total absolute 
deviation ($2,977.10) 
 Consistent overage of 
about 29 percent 
 Same total absolute 
deviation ($96.74) as the 
Clicks-based strategy 
 Consistent underage in 
all stages 
Volume-based 
allocation 
strategy 
 Higher total absolute 
deviation ($909.86) than 
the Cost-based strategy, 
but lower than the Clicks-
based and Baseline 
strategies 
 Under-budgeted in all 
stages, except “purchase”, 
but including the 
“decision” stage 
 Slightly higher total 
absolute deviation 
($99.03) than the Cost-
based strategy 
 Provides sufficient 
budget in all stages 
including the focal 
“awareness” and 
“research” stages, but is 
under-budgeted by a 
percentage in the 
“decision” stage 
 Slightly higher total 
absolute deviation 
($3,212.30) than the Cost-
based strategy 
 Provides adequate 
budget to all stages except 
for the “purchase” stage. 
 The focal segments have 
excess budget 
 Higher total absolute 
deviation ($234.79) than 
the Cost- and Clicks-
based strategies, but much 
lower than the Baseline 
 Under-budgeted in all 
stages, except the 
“research” stage 
 
Clicks-based 
allocation 
strategy 
 Higher total absolute 
deviation ($1,768.38) than 
Cost- and Volume-based 
strategies, but much lower 
than the Baseline 
 Under-budgeted in 
“awareness” and 
“research” and over-
budgeted in “decision” 
and “purchase” stages 
where more budget is 
required 
 Slightly higher total 
absolute deviation 
($157.70) than Cost- and 
Volume-based strategies, 
but much lower than the 
Baseline 
 Under-budgeted in the 
focal “awareness” stage 
and sufficiently budgeted 
in the other three stages 
 Slightly higher total 
absolute deviation 
($3,518.03) than Cost- 
and Volume-based 
strategies, but much lower 
than the Baseline 
 Under-budgeted in the 
focal “research” stage and 
in the “purchase stage 
 Overage in the 
“awareness” and 
decision” stages 
 Same total absolute 
deviation ($96.74) as the 
Cost-based strategy 
 Under-budgeted in all 
stages  
 Has the lowest lost 
opportunity of one percent 
in the focal “awareness” 
stage, but 19 percent 
underage in the “research” 
stage 
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Baseline 
allocation 
strategy 
 Highest total absolute 
deviation ($3,161.69) 
 Unable to account for 
the varying costs across 
the stages 
 Highest total absolute 
deviation ($1,215.24) 
 Unable to account for 
the varying costs across 
the stages.  
 Significant underage  
(-149%) in the 
“awareness” stage 
 Highest total absolute 
deviation ($5,135.05) 
 Unable to account for 
the varying costs across 
the stages 
 Over 80 percent of the 
allocated budget is 
unutilized in the 
“decision” and “purchase” 
stages 
 Highest total absolute 
deviation ($2,093.35) 
 Unable to account for 
the varying costs across 
the stages 
 Has better budget 
allocation in the 
“research” stage than both 
the Volume-based and 
Clicks-Based strategies 
Key 
implications 
The inferred strategy of 
clicks and conversions is 
best attained using the 
Clicks-based allocation 
strategy. This strategy 
allocates more budget to 
the final two stages 
“decision” and “purchase” 
where clicks are the most 
important 
The inferred strategy of 
awareness is best attained 
by both the Cost-based 
and Volume-based 
allocation strategies. The 
Cost-based is 
recommended due to the 
one percent misallocation 
in the “decision” stage 
using the Volume-based 
allocation strategy 
The inferred strategy of 
awareness is best attained 
by both the Cost-based 
and Volume-based 
allocation strategies. The 
Volume-based strategy 
only misallocates the 
“purchase” stage but with 
such little contribution this 
translates to a loss of 
$117.60  
The inferred strategy of 
clicks is in the early stages 
of “awareness” and 
“research” is best served 
by the Clicks-based 
allocation strategy. While 
there is 19 percent 
overage in the “research” 
stage, the low 
misallocation  
(-1%) in the “awareness” 
stage is more important 
Final 
recommend-
ations 
In line with the goal of 
clicks and conversions, 
the Clicks-based strategy 
is best able to allocate 
budget to the “decision” 
and “purchase” stages 
 
 
With a focus on 
generating awareness the 
Volume-based allocation 
strategy is most in line 
with the inferred 
marketing strategy and 
sufficiently allocates 
budget to the focal 
segments 
To create consumer 
awareness of its brand, the 
Volume-based strategy 
provides more than 
sufficient budget for the 
focal stages of 
“awareness” and 
“research” 
 
With an emphasis on 
having consumers utilize 
its reservation system, the 
Clicks-based strategy is 
best able to allocate 
budget to the “awareness” 
stage  
Considering the longer-term higher involvement purchase decisions Lenovo’s consumers 
face, it invests more in “decision” and “purchase” keywords, relative to the other cases 
(companies). Of note is that, as expected, “purchase” keywords, where in this cognitive stage the 
objective is to convert consumers, there is a larger contribution of clicks compared to the other 
segments. This would suggest that the keywords are serving their intended purposes. As a result, 
the Clicks-based strategy allocated more budget to these campaigns and has sufficient budget 
capable of accommodating the higher number of clicks. 
As a department store with a vast array of products varying in consumer purchase 
involvement and intensity, Macy’s investment of keywords follows the shape of the buying funnel. 
Considering that the majority of the products Macy’s carries are low involvement purchases, such 
as clothing and accessories, it is most likely that it has an overall awareness oriented marketing 
goal. The purpose is to make a consumer aware that it carries the products they are searching for 
and then subsequently cross-and up-sell once on its website. In confirmation of this is the 
dominating contribution of the “awareness” keywords to total cost, clicks, and volume. 
Interestingly, the shape of the traditional buying funnel is violated by the low percent contribution 
of the “research” keywords to cost, volume, and clicks. While clicks may be the marketing goal, 
due to “awareness” keywords having a cost contribution (67%) much larger than its clicks 
contribution (60%), the Clicks-Based strategy did not allocate enough budget. It resulted in 
overage for “awareness” keywords and has excess budget or underage in the three other segments. 
However, considering the marketing objective of awareness, the Volume-based strategy 
sufficiently allocates budget to the “awareness” keywords (3% overage), and is only under-
allocated for “decision” keywords (-1%). 
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In Prudential’s case, the inferred marking objective is to generate “awareness” and 
convince consumers to buy their insurance products at the “research” stage, likely targeting them 
via promotional material to convince them to buy their products through offline channels. The 
highly personal nature of life insurance products raises issues of privacy and targeting. As Goldfarb 
& Tucker (2011a) found, privacy plays a crucial role in the likelihood of a consumer clicking on 
an advertisement, and Kim & Sundar (2010) found that relevance plays an important role in 
reducing negative perceptions of advertisements. Thus, the highly personal nature of life insurance 
and related products limits the ability of life insurance advertisers to create effective, targeted, and 
highly relevant advertisements in the “decision” and “purchase” stages, except for generic 
products. Considering this awareness focus, the allocation of budget using the Volume-based 
strategy provides more than sufficient budget in the lead generation stages (“awareness” and 
“research”) and only exceeds budget in the “purchase” stage. On the other hand, due to the high 
CPCs of Prudential’s “research” keywords, the Clicks-based strategy is unable to allocate enough 
budget and it exceeds the budget with nine percent underage. 
As discussed earlier, the Airlines industry in which United Continental Holdings operates 
is highly competitive. It has the most competitive keywords of all the companies, in all stages, 
except for “purchase” (see Figure 5-5). Additionally, given that air travel is treated as a commodity 
by most consumers and that information about or the service quality of fights is assumed to be 
virtually similar across companies, the focus of United’s sponsored search initiative is competing 
on price and attaining clicks in the “awareness” and “research” stages. Thus, the inferred goal at 
these stages is to have consumers click and book through United Continental Holding’ reservation 
system. This awareness and research focus is further highlighted by the overwhelming lack of 
“decision” and “purchase” keywords, which combined represent only four percent of all keywords. 
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Considering the importance of clicks and navigation to its website, as shown in Figure 6-15, of all 
the allocation strategies, the Clicks-based strategy allocates budget most appropriately to 
“awareness” but exceeds its budget in the “research” campaign with 19 percent underage, while 
the Volume-based strategy exceeds the budget for “awareness” keywords with 11 percent 
underage, and has excess budget in the “research” stage with 13 percent overage and the Cost-
based is consistently under-budgeted in both “awareness” and “research” campaigns. 
Overall, as the results indicate, the company (industry it competes in), its inferred 
marketing strategy, and its product/service offerings inform which allocation strategy will perform 
the best. Additionally, while the Cost-based allocation strategy essentially spreads the average 
percent overage/underage consistently across all campaigns, it may not be the best strategy for all 
companies. For example, in United Continental Holdings’ case (Figure 6-15), the allocation 
strategy more closely associated with United’s inferred marketing strategy provides the relevant 
campaigns with better allocation of budget. 
While Jansen and Shuster (2011) found that the buying funnel is sufficient for 
discriminating between keywords and their performance measures, they suggested that the ‘funnel’ 
may not be the best shape for describing the search process using their dataset from a large nation-
wide retail chain. As my results confirm, the buying funnel model is adaptable to different domains 
and is capable of meaningfully segmenting keywords. However, as the resulting classification of 
keywords and the simulation results for cost, volume, and clicks show, the generalization of the 
‘funnel’ shape as an imperfect representation of the search process may not be a correct assertion. 
Counter to that assertion is, in all cases except for Prudential, the investment in keywords follows 
the funnel shape. Further, both Prudential and United Continental Holdings have percent 
contributions of cost, volume, and clicks that follow the ‘funnel’ shape. In the two other cases, 
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Lenovo and Macy’s, the low contribution of the “research” keywords shows a disparity from the 
‘funnel’ shape. These findings are not surprising considering the growing list of research that 
demonstrate that depending on product/industry (Lu & Zhao, 2014; Nottorf & Funk, 2013), 
differences in consumer behavior is expected. Therefore, the buying funnel is a flexible 
framework, capable of adapting to domain specific keywords. 
The results clearly show that sponsored search is largely used as a lead generation tool. In 
all cases except for Prudential, the keywords classified into the “awareness” stage account for 
largest percent of budget consumption. Three of the four cases have 50 percent or more of the 
budget consumed in the “awareness” stage (Lenovo 50%, Macy’s 67%, and United Continental 
Holdings 76%). This implies that advertisers can improve their budget utilization by segmenting 
their keywords and organizing their campaigns according to their promotional goals. With this 
observation, the common strategy of allocating equal budgets to campaigns with different 
promotional goals can easily lead to poor budget utilization and lost opportunities.  
Another observation is that, in all cases except Macy’s, in the “research” stage the click 
contribution is much less than the volume contribution. This is not surprising, considering that, as 
shown in Figure 5-4 and Figure 5-5, the “research” stage is on average the most competitive and 
the hardest segment to attain a high position, which drives the cost of clicks up and the click-
through rate down. However, it is interesting to note that this phenomenon is shown in all cases 
with “research” keywords, where in this cognitive stage, the customer has decided on which 
product they want, most likely demonstrates commercial intent, but has not decided on a brand 
(Jansen & Shuster, 2011).This finding suggests “research” keywords are crucial. In the “research” 
stage, awareness or volume and exposure to consumers is important and may be even more than 
clicks. Specifically, this is the final stage where an advertiser can inject its brand into the 
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consumers’ consideration set prior to reaching the “decision” stage, where the consumer is 
considering alternatives and doing comparison shopping, and prior to the “purchase” stage where 
the consumer knows what and/or where he/she wants to purchase. As further emphasis of the 
importance of this stage, in Prudential’s case, the “research” stage is its focus, as shown by the 
contribution to the number of keywords (56%). It is also Prudential’s most expensive segment 
(average CPC of $11.07 and cost contribution of 44%), and relative to the number of keywords 
(56%), it contributes less volume (38%), and significantly less clicks (28%). 
7.1 Limitations and Future Research 
This study has a number of limitations that should be acknowledged or addressed in future 
research. First of all, the simulation experiments are not conducted in a real-time setting. This may 
have implications on the consumption of budget, where on any given day, a high utility keyword 
may be highly searched and drain a campaign budget in the first hours of the day, meaning no ads 
will be shown for that campaign for the remainder of the day (Zhang et al., 2013). Future research 
can assess the proposed allocation strategies in real-time AdWords accounts to examine the 
outcomes in a more practical, competitive setting. In addition, throughout the simulation 
experiments, the account level budget is assumed to be fixed. Future research can plan to combine 
the account level budget setting decision with the campaign allocation decision. 
While this study used the buying funnel model as the main theoretical framework, there is 
a growing body of literature on the segmentation of keywords (Ashkan & Clark, 2013; Broder, 
2002; Ghose & Yang, 2010; Jansen et al., 2008; Lu & Zhao, 2014; Nottorf & Fun; Rutz & Bucklin, 
2011). Future studies can compare the effectiveness of these other theoretical frameworks for 
similar purposes. Furthermore, while the study only used four campaigns, each representative of a 
stage of the buying funnel, this may not reflect the way advertisers currently organize their 
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accounts. As Zhang et al. (2014) show, according to their data, the average advertiser has 15 
campaigns and a max of over 2000. In future studies, I hope to gain access to an active AdWords 
account to test the effectiveness of the proposed strategies and the overlay of the buying funnel 
framework on an existing account structure. The segmentation of keywords in this thesis was also 
limited to the application of the descriptions as given by Jansen and Shuster (2011). Although I 
was able to easily apply the simple guidelines they set out, a more comprehensive set of definitions 
is needed to effectively extend it to different domains and product/service categories.  
The simulation experiments were also conducted using historical third-party data, which 
limited parameter estimates and the approximation of distributions across segments and at the 
individual keyword level. In future studies, I plan to have access to an active AdWords account in 
order to account for daily, weekly, and other cyclical trends that are typically observed in 
sponsored search. Additionally, because this study was limited to the use of third party data, data 
for quality scores, account hierarchy and organization, and the advertisements the keywords trigger 
were unavailable. With this information, a comparison between the existing account hierarchy and 
organization could be made with an organization based on the buying funnel. The problems of ad 
attribution and the estimation of value-per-click (VPC) could be added with the additional 
information about which advertisements were triggered by a keyword, the landing pages they point 
to, and the context of the lading page (purpose/function). In addition, more accurate classification 
could be achieved with the additional context of the advertisements (marketing message). Overall, 
the use of an active AdWords account could significantly improve the capabilities of the proposed 
model and its practical validation. 
While these simple allocation strategies were better able to allocate the campaign level 
budget than the Baseline, more complex strategies and algorithms can improve upon this further. 
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To this end, the combined use of attribution modeling and an active AdWords account would 
provide ample opportunity to investigate the effects of additional measures. For instance, 
knowledge of the purpose (marketing context) of the landing page of a keyword would provide 
better opportunities for value estimation and the extension of this problem. Additionally, the true 
valuation of a search user landing on an advertiser’s webpage would make the prioritization of 
marketing objectives in dollar terms more clear. This allows for better value estimation throughout 
the course of a sponsored search initiative. Furthermore, this allows for extending the current 
simulation model to incorporate value-based optimization.  
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 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I studied the segmentation of keywords, organization of campaigns, and budget 
allocation problems. For this purpose, I proposed the use of the buying funnel framework to 
segment keywords and organize campaigns, in addition to the use of the proposed allocation 
strategies to align sponsored search initiatives with marketing goals and to improve the allocation 
of the daily advertising budget across marketing campaigns. I used four different cases sampled 
from a large collection of companies from many industries to demonstrate the implications of four 
different allocation strategies, including a baseline strategy. Experimental results show that the 
proposed allocation strategies consistently outperform the baseline strategy commonly used in 
practice.  
I demonstrated the benefits of segmenting keywords into the buying funnel as a means to 
identify and track marketing objectives and for prioritizing campaign level budget allocation based 
on the marketing objectives. Further, I demonstrate that the buying funnel framework is adaptable 
and flexible enough to be applied to multiple account structures and that it can be applied in 
conjunction with other frameworks such as the product development life cycle to organize and 
justify keyword investments. 
For future work, I plan to extend the current study in multiple angles. For example, I plan 
to introduce more complex allocation strategies/algorithms, incorporate constraints, apply other 
methods of keyword segmentation and campaign organization, augment with value-based 
optimization and validate the current simulation model expanded samples. 
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Appendix A Sample Data, Variables, and Descriptive Statistics 
Table A-1 Industries and companies selected 
  
INDUSTRY COMPANY NAME URL
Airlines United Continental Holdings United.com
Delta Air Lnes delta.com
Deutsche Luftansa AG lufthansa.com
Air France-KLM airfrance.com
American Airlines Group Inc. aa.com
Apparel, Footwear, Acc Design Nike Inc. nike.com
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton louisvuitton.com
Adidas AG adidas .com
Cie Financial Richmont SA dunhill.com
Kering gucci.com
Automobile OEM Toyota Motor Corp toyota.com
Volkswagen AG vw.com
General Motors Co gm.com
Ford Motor Co ford.com
Honda Motor Co Ltd honda.com
Banking Bank of America Corp bankofamerica.com
Wells Fargo & Co wellsfargo.com
JPMorgan Chase & Co jpmorgan.com
US Bancorp/MN usbank.com
capitalone.com capitalone.com
Beverages Coca-Cola Co/The coca-colacompany.com
Nestle SA nestle.com
PepsiCo Inc pepsi.com
Computer Hardware Lenovo Group Ltd lenovo.com
Hewlett-Packard Co hp.com
Acer Inc acer.com
Asustek Computer Inc asus.com
Apple Inc apple.com
Department Stores Macy's Inc macys.com
Sears Holdings Corp sears.com
Kohl's Corp kohls.com
Nordstrom Inc nordstrom.com
JC Penny Co Inc jcpenney.com
IT Services International Business Machines ibm.com
Hewlett-Packard Co hp.com
Accenture PLC accenture.com
Cap Gemini SA capgemini.com
Computer Sciences Corp csc.com
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Table A-1 Industries and companies selected (cont’d) 
 
  
INDUSTRY COMPANY NAME URL
Internet Media Google Inc google.com
Facebook Inc facebook.com
Yahoo! Inc yahoo.com
Groupon Inc groupon.com
Life Insurance Prudential Financial Inc prudential.com
AXA SA axa.com
Metlife Inc metlife.com
UnitedHealth Group unitedhealthgroup.com
Lodging Accor SA novotel.com
Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc hilton.com
InterContinental Hotels Group intercontinental.com
Marriot International Inc/DE marriott.com
Wyndham Worldwide Corp wyndham.com
Mass Merchants Wal-Mart Stores Inc walmart.com
Costco Wholesale Corp costco.com
Target Corp target.com
Dollar General Corp dollargeneral.com
Sears Holdings Corp sears.com
Restaurants Starbucks Corp starbucks.com
McDonald's Corp mcdonalds.com
Darden Restaurants Inc olivegarden.com
Bloomin' Brands Inc outback.com
Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc chipotle.com
Retail Discretionary Home Depot Inc/The homedepot.com
Amazon.com amazon.com
Lowe's Cos Inc lowes.com
Best Buy Co Inc bestbuy.com
TJX Cos Inc/The tjx.com
Software Microsoft Corp microsoft.com
Internationa Business Machines ibm.com
Oracle Group oracle.com
SAP SE sap.com
Symantec Corp symantec.com
Telecom Carriers AT&T Inc att.com
Verizon Communications Inc verizonwireless.com
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Company ntt.com
Deutshe Telekom AG t-mobile.com
Vodafone vodaphone.com
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Table A-2 Term definitions according to spyfu.com 
 
Item from Spyfu.com CSV file Description According to Spyfu.com
term The keyword term bid on by a domain
position At the time that we searched, it is the order where this domain’s ad appeared on this keyword.
exact_local_daily_search_volume
Average number of times each month that Google users search this keyword, based (by default) on exact match 
figures in the US. “Local” is specific to US nationwide searches.
exact_global_daily_search_volume
Average number of times each month that Google users search this keyword, based (by default) on exact match 
figures in the US. “Global” figures include world-wide traffic from Google searches in all countries.
full_url The exact URL (link) where Google directs you for this result.
broad_cost_per_click
The average amount advertisers pay Google anytime someone clicks their own ad for this keyword. The default 
is “broad match” costs, but exact match and phrase match are available. By experimenting in the Google Traffic 
estimator, we find the cost per click that comes closest to our target Avg. Ad Position of 2.0.
phrase_cost_per_click
The average amount advertisers pay Google anytime someone clicks their own ad for this keyword. The default 
is “broad match” costs, but exact match and phrase match are available. By experimenting in the Google Traffic 
estimator, we find the cost per click that comes closest to our target Avg. Ad Position of 2.0.
exact_cost_per_click
The average amount advertisers pay Google anytime someone clicks their own ad for this keyword. The default 
is “broad match” costs, but exact match and phrase match are available. By experimenting in the Google Traffic 
estimator, we find the cost per click that comes closest to our target Avg. Ad Position of 2.0.
broad_clicks_per_day
The number of clicks your ad may receive each day for this keyword. Each advertiser’s expected clicks will vary. 
By experimenting in the Google Traffic estimator, we find the clicks per day that come closest to our target Avg. 
Ad Position of 2.0.
phrase_clicks_per_day
The number of clicks your ad may receive each day for this keyword. Each advertiser’s expected clicks will vary. 
By experimenting in the Google Traffic estimator, we find the clicks per day that come closest to our target Avg. 
Ad Position of 2.0.
exact_clicks_per_day
The number of clicks your ad may receive each day for this keyword. Each advertiser’s expected clicks will vary. 
By experimenting in the Google Traffic estimator, we find the clicks per day that come closest to our target Avg. 
Ad Position of 2.0.
broad_cost_per_day
This amount is what Google estimates you would spend, on average, to advertise on this keyword each day if 
you were to aim for an average ad position of 2.0. We multiply the CPC for this keyword by the number of 
expected clicks.
phrase_cost_per_day
This amount is what Google estimates you would spend, on average, to advertise on this keyword each day if 
you were to aim for an average ad position of 2.0. We multiply the CPC for this keyword by the number of 
expected clicks.
exact_cost_per_day
This amount is what Google estimates you would spend, on average, to advertise on this keyword each day if 
you were to aim for an average ad position of 2.0. We multiply the CPC for this keyword by the number of 
expected clicks.
max_search_date_id
In Ad History, this coded date tells us which month to assign a particular ad in a domain’s activity history. For 
more, see “Run Date.” Search Position: See “Ad Position/Search Position.” Run Date: We refresh our data 
monthly, and “run date” is how we tag that entire month. Something with a run date of 2013/06/01 was 
collected sometime in June and published at the beginning of July. (Also listed as Search Date)
weighting_rank
This column header is exclusive to Excel/CSV downloads and does not offer insight outside of its context.  It 
serves an internal purpose, helping to keep the default order of paid keywords so that a domain’s ten best 
keywords are at the top.
ad_history_overview
SpyFu’s Ad History lets you see all of the keywords that a domain has bought over the last 6+ years, along with 
the evolution of ad copy they used for each one. Clicking the history button from this grid takes you to the 
domain’s history for this specific keyword.
advertisers This shows how many unique advertisers have appeared on this keyword in the last 3 months via AdWords.
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Table A-3 Descriptive statistics by company 
LENOVO VOLUME POSITION ADVERTISERS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC
Mean 18.71 5.19 11.58 1.03 1.73 2.91
Median 5.00 4.00 10.00 0.70 1.29 2.08
Mode 1.00 1.00 19.00 0.01 0.01 0.99
Standard Deviation 38.42 4.31 7.36 1.11 1.66 2.99
Kurtosis 24.73 1.67 -1.64 3.62 5.63 27.25
Skewness 4.41 1.38 -0.02 1.76 1.96 3.75
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Maximum 330.00 21.00 22.00 6.48 12.00 36.54
MACY'S VOLUME POSITION ADVERTISERS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC
Mean 11.93 6.70 14.71 0.58 0.97 1.50
Median 3.00 5.00 17.00 0.46 0.79 1.16
Mode 1.00 2.00 19.00 0.02 0.01 1.23
Standard Deviation 28.23 4.96 5.68 0.53 0.85 1.38
Kurtosis 55.40 0.06 -0.39 4.04 35.05 22.33
Skewness 6.51 1.00 -0.99 1.64 3.86 3.64
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Maximum 330.00 22.00 22.00 3.92 12.11 15.59
PRUDENTIAL VOLUME POSITION ADVERTISERS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC
Mean 7.93 8.20 16.03 5.33 8.49 12.87
Median 2.33 7.00 19.00 2.96 6.03 9.23
Mode 1.00 1.00 19.00 0.01 0.01 0.10
Standard Deviation 18.44 5.91 6.29 6.45 9.00 12.96
Kurtosis 84.47 -0.76 -0.47 3.10 11.57 13.82
Skewness 7.80 0.63 -1.01 1.75 2.33 2.76
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.03
Maximum 270.00 22.00 22.00 35.74 93.96 122.53
UNITED VOLUME POSITION ADVERTISERS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC
Mean 7.51 7.53 17.09 0.95 1.55 2.67
Median 3.00 6.00 19.00 0.77 1.31 1.96
Mode 1.00 1.00 19.00 0.01 0.01 1.58
Standard Deviation 11.59 5.60 5.46 0.88 1.28 2.87
Kurtosis 9.35 -0.48 0.51 9.85 15.07 52.09
Skewness 2.95 0.75 -1.29 2.19 2.84 5.49
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Maximum 63.00 22.00 22.00 8.83 12.53 42.72
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Table A-4 Descriptive statistics by campaign for the four companies 
VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC
Mean 21.88 6.18 14.91 $1.26 $2.19 $3.64 9.09 6.37 13.95 $1.48 $2.34 $3.81 22.66 3.61 6.94 $0.66 $1.09 $1.93 18.43 3.16 6.05 $0.35 $0.60 $1.09
Median 5.00 5.00 18.00 $0.95 $1.91 $3.12 3.00 6.00 17.00 $1.19 $1.80 $2.81 7.00 2.00 4.00 $0.47 $0.90 $1.30 7.00 2.00 4.00 $0.18 $0.47 $0.88
Mode 1.00 6.00 19.00 $0.01 $0.01 $2.01 1.00 6.00 19.00 $0.01 $2.67 $1.68 1.00 1.00 2.00 $0.02 $0.18 $2.22 1.00 1.00 2.00 $0.02 $0.10 $0.75
Standard Deviation 50.57 4.34 6.43 $1.21 $1.76 $2.99 16.42 4.08 6.42 $1.24 $1.88 $3.47 33.10 3.98 6.25 $0.68 $0.98 $2.56 26.53 3.53 5.48 $0.43 $0.50 $0.96
Kurtosis 17.38 1.13 -0.80 $2.70 $4.06 $39.60 13.54 1.66 -1.45 $1.27 $4.18 $9.70 7.21 4.84 0.04 $6.65 $9.19 $48.48 4.68 6.53 0.83 $2.77 $0.24 $11.82
Skewness 4.00 1.20 -0.82 $1.52 $1.58 $4.34 3.44 1.21 -0.37 $1.23 $1.74 $2.49 2.45 2.18 1.17 $2.06 $2.33 $5.84 2.23 2.54 1.40 $1.76 $0.93 $2.64
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.10 1.00 1.00 1.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.02
Maximum 330.00 20.00 22.00 $6.48 $12.00 $36.54 97.00 20.00 22.00 $5.72 $11.55 $25.63 180.00 21.00 22.00 $4.55 $6.88 $26.71 120.00 18.00 22.00 $2.10 $2.33 $7.21
VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC
Mean 15.44 6.78 15.03 $0.63 $1.08 $1.71 7.59 7.72 15.55 $0.61 $0.96 $1.47 9.67 5.45 13.32 $0.47 $0.79 $1.20 7.49 6.58 13.86 $0.44 $0.72 $1.05
Median 4.00 6.00 17.00 $0.51 $0.91 $1.31 3.00 6.00 17.00 $0.51 $0.78 $1.11 4.00 4.00 16.00 $0.34 $0.62 $0.92 3.00 5.00 16.00 $0.36 $0.63 $0.88
Mode 1.00 2.00 19.00 $0.02 $0.01 $1.53 2.00 4.00 19.00 $0.02 $0.64 $0.86 2.00 3.00 19.00 $0.02 $0.29 $0.67 1.00 3.00 16.00 $0.01 $0.83 $1.69
Standard Deviation 37.20 4.85 5.49 $0.56 $0.97 $1.61 12.98 5.30 5.04 $0.54 $0.74 $1.16 14.78 4.54 6.41 $0.49 $0.71 $1.01 12.36 5.10 5.86 $0.36 $0.45 $0.82
Kurtosis 33.69 -0.07 -0.19 $4.27 $37.59 $20.57 17.23 -0.51 0.88 $1.25 $2.24 $8.37 10.64 1.57 -1.21 $6.45 $17.12 $5.59 9.30 0.74 -0.97 $3.37 $1.42 $20.85
Skewness 5.30 0.91 -1.07 $1.63 $4.27 $3.70 3.84 0.74 -1.37 $1.19 $1.35 $2.25 3.11 1.51 -0.60 $2.09 $3.10 $2.09 3.01 1.28 -0.68 $1.52 $1.07 $3.71
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.02 1.00 1.00 2.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.03
Maximum 330.00 20.00 22.00 $3.92 $12.11 $15.59 80.00 22.00 22.00 $2.64 $4.30 $8.76 80.00 20.00 22.00 $3.18 $5.99 $5.99 63.00 21.00 22.00 $1.91 $2.24 $6.17
VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC
Mean 13.74 6.85 14.77 $1.98 $4.35 $7.94 5.12 9.23 17.37 $7.22 $11.07 $16.18 6.97 6.41 12.17 $3.67 $5.29 $7.66 4.57 7.49 14.31 $7.13 $9.54 $13.53
Median 3.67 6.00 18.00 $0.81 $2.89 $5.33 2.33 8.00 19.00 $4.92 $8.33 $12.54 4.17 5.00 13.50 $2.71 $4.55 $6.58 3.00 6.00 18.00 $5.87 $7.65 $13.48
Mode 1.00 1.00 19.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.10 1.00 5.00 19.00 $0.10 $0.10 $8.73 1.00 1.00 19.00 $0.01 $0.10 $5.04 1.00 3.00 22.00 $0.01 $0.01 #N/A
Standard Deviation 30.15 5.34 6.41 $2.51 $4.80 $9.53 7.58 6.09 5.54 $7.47 $10.37 $14.53 8.82 5.19 7.60 $3.31 $3.88 $5.06 5.65 5.94 7.40 $5.46 $6.64 $7.80
Kurtosis 32.27 -0.19 -1.03 $1.84 $3.64 $18.35 14.34 -1.02 0.71 $1.17 $9.15 $11.70 7.70 0.10 -1.67 $0.49 -$0.55 $1.35 12.82 -0.42 -1.37 -$0.35 -$0.40 -$0.14
Skewness 5.05 0.90 -0.68 $1.58 $1.74 $3.39 3.42 0.44 -1.44 $1.27 $2.01 $2.53 2.61 0.95 -0.13 $1.06 $0.60 $1.02 3.20 0.90 -0.57 $0.68 $0.60 $0.59
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.10 1.00 1.00 1.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.07 1.00 1.00 1.00 $0.01 $0.01 $2.19
Maximum 270.00 22.00 22.00 $11.00 $28.68 $84.73 53.00 22.00 22.00 $35.74 $93.96 $122.53 43.00 21.00 22.00 $12.79 $14.02 $25.82 33.00 20.00 22.00 $20.71 $27.15 $33.12
VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC VOL POS ADVERTS MIN CPC EXP. CPC MAX CPC
Mean 8.50 6.57 15.68 $0.79 $1.36 $2.45 6.58 8.85 19.33 $1.12 $1.76 $2.91 2.93 9.30 17.00 $1.32 $1.93 $3.32 3.75 5.67 11.17 $1.85 $2.67 $3.33
Median 3.00 5.00 19.00 $0.63 $1.18 $1.83 3.00 8.00 20.00 $0.95 $1.46 $2.24 2.00 8.00 19.50 $1.06 $1.59 $2.26 4.50 6.00 10.00 $0.83 $1.10 $1.16
Mode 1.00 1.00 19.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.99 1.00 10.00 22.00 $0.01 $0.01 $1.67 1.00 7.00 22.00 $1.09 #N/A #N/A 1.00 6.00 10.00 #N/A #N/A #N/A
Standard Deviation 12.89 5.41 5.92 $0.73 $1.13 $2.99 9.96 5.63 3.53 $0.90 $1.26 $2.57 2.72 5.75 5.83 $1.12 $1.39 $3.34 2.63 3.77 6.71 $2.68 $3.92 $4.37
Kurtosis 7.12 -0.09 -0.52 $3.97 $17.66 $75.11 12.07 -0.73 6.60 $3.27 $8.22 $14.35 5.63 -0.65 -0.68 $1.03 -$0.88 $3.99 -1.55 -1.52 -1.24 $3.89 $3.27 $0.95
Skewness 2.66 0.97 -0.87 $1.60 $3.03 $7.07 3.20 0.52 -2.49 $1.46 $2.05 $3.19 2.18 0.56 -1.04 $1.23 $0.57 $1.94 0.15 -0.01 0.19 $2.05 $1.99 $1.47
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.03 1.00 1.00 4.00 $0.01 $0.01 $0.11 1.00 1.00 5.00 $0.04 $0.04 $0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 $0.02 $0.02 $0.02
Maximum 63.00 22.00 22.00 $4.79 $10.96 $42.72 63.00 22.00 22.00 $5.53 $10.64 $20.55 13.00 20.00 22.00 $4.46 $4.47 $14.60 8.00 11.00 22.00 $8.83 $12.53 $12.56
LENOVO
MACY'S
PRUDENTIAL
UNITED
C1 AWARENESS C2 RESEARCH C3 DECISION C4 PURCHASE
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Table A-5 Average performance across all numeric variables from spyfu.com files 
INDUSTRY COMPANY NAME URL MONTHLY BUDGET # OF KW PAID CLKS POSITION LOCAL SEARCH GLOBALSEARCH BROAD CPC PHRASE CPC EXACT CPC BROAD CLKS/DAY PHRASE CLKS/DAY EXACT CLKS/DAY BROAD $/DAY PHRASE $/DAY EXACT $/DAY ADVERTISERS
Airlines United Continental Holdings United.com $61,500.00 21348 22000 7.25 6.52 14.23 $1.70 $1.68 $1.72 1.54 0.35 0.19 $1.92 $0.44 $0.27 16.71
Delta Air Lnes delta.com $57,500.00 7963 12600 6.73 38.45 56.94 $3.19 $3.53 $3.77 2.29 1.15 0.38 $6.53 $2.68 $0.67 14.00
Deutsche Luftansa AG lufthansa.com/ $37,000.00 20371 12800 9.39 9.72 31.00 $1.59 $1.47 $1.38 1.51 0.38 0.23 $1.89 $0.45 $0.28 16.74
Air France-KLM airfrance.com $2,040.00 1223 2470 8.63 4.01 17.94 $1.76 $1.43 $1.50 1.88 0.25 0.11 $3.47 $0.44 $0.21 13.57
American Airlines Group Inc. aa.com $73,200.00 28207 31300 7.62 11.19 27.51 $1.40 $1.45 $1.45 2.01 0.78 0.26 $1.67 $0.61 $0.28 15.44
AVERAGE $46,248.00 15822.40 16234.00 7.92 13.98 29.52 $1.93 $1.91 $1.96 1.84 0.58 0.23 $3.10 $0.93 $0.34 15.29
Apparel, Footwear, Acc Design Nike Inc. nike.com $124,000.00 49927 252000 7.20 19.41 50.38 $1.00 $1.00 $1.14 2.73 1.43 0.40 $2.06 $0.86 $0.30 13.75
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton louisvuitton.com/ $6,360.00 1992 7500 4.50 36.32 101.01 $1.29 $1.16 $1.20 2.33 1.23 0.51 $1.56 $0.37 $0.24 13.09
Adidas AG adidas .com $44,000.00 17474 67600 6.40 13.16 40.41 $1.06 $0.99 $1.08 1.79 0.99 0.31 $1.42 $0.60 $0.25 12.93
Cie Financial Richmont SA dunhill.com $1,420.00 286 847 2.41 3.46 18.13 $1.05 $0.87 $0.93 0.39 0.34 0.11 $0.20 $0.13 $0.19 8.05
Kering gucci.com/ $21,500.00 7596 40200 5.16 9.07 25.15 $1.01 $1.00 $1.04 1.76 0.71 0.25 $2.02 $0.40 $0.18 14.65
AVERAGE $39,456.00 15455.00 73629.40 5.13 16.28 47.01 $1.08 $1.00 $1.08 1.80 0.94 0.31 $1.45 $0.47 $0.23 12.49
Automobile OEM Toyota Motor Corp toyota.com $294,000.00 29306 562000 6.18 18.10 45.78 $2.57 $2.31 $2.50 3.46 1.67 0.40 $7.83 $3.45 $1.10 14.41
Volkswagen AG vw.com $183,000.00 39754 255000 4.13 7.99 32.51 $0.89 $0.90 $1.00 1.47 0.90 0.19 $3.47 $1.79 $0.45 8.57
General Motors Co gm.com $16,300.00 1594 14700 2.34 23.50 69.35 $3.51 $3.63 $3.76 1.27 0.40 0.14 $3.69 $1.71 $0.68 5.94
Ford Motor Co ford.com $833,000.00 99175 1160000 6.79 11.68 29.42 $1.62 $1.70 $1.84 3.81 1.56 0.28 $8.06 $3.22 $0.57 12.95
Honda Motor Co Ltd honda.com $256,000.00 35005 462000 7.84 14.13 36.54 $2.21 $2.22 $2.37 3.53 1.40 0.34 $6.59 $2.30 $0.72 14.42
AVERAGE $316,460.00 40966.80 490740.00 5.46 15.08 42.72 $2.16 $2.15 $2.29 2.71 1.18 0.27 $5.93 $2.49 $0.70 11.26
Banking Bank of America Corp bankofamerica.com $927,000.00 118358 363000 6.43 9.18 12.93 $2.73 $2.92 $2.98 1.10 0.48 0.11 $5.79 $2.34 $0.47 13.12
Wells Fargo & Co wellsfargo.com $1,280,000.00 102922 263000 8.17 11.06 14.64 $4.36 $4.57 $4.61 1.41 0.51 0.12 $7.27 $2.82 $0.63 15.96
JPMorgan Chase & Co jpmorgan.com $16,300.00 1364 11400 3.90 3.12 8.02 $3.53 $3.68 $3.45 0.61 0.22 0.07 $1.71 $0.72 $0.26 11.92
US Bancorp/MN usbank.com $492,000.00 29781 149000 7.58 6.74 9.51 $4.83 $5.18 $5.37 1.90 0.69 0.10 $13.09 $4.71 $0.85 16.75
capitalone.com capitalone.com $1,020,000.00 55168 417000 7.33 13.14 19.86 $5.05 $5.46 $5.64 1.93 0.70 0.19 $11.47 $3.90 $0.82 17.39
AVERAGE $747,060.00 61518.60 240680.00 6.68 8.65 12.99 $4.10 $4.36 $4.41 1.39 0.52 0.12 $7.87 $2.90 $0.60 15.03
Beverages Coca-Cola Co/The coca-colacompany.com $1,720.00 740.00 1570.00 2.12 9.81 20.29 $1.39 $1.24 $1.24 0.94 0.23 0.16 $0.99 $0.20 $0.15 5.13
Nestle SA nestle.com $467.00 104.00 133.00 6.61 16.97 58.06 $1.64 $1.70 $1.97 2.59 0.79 0.17 $2.78 $0.70 $0.32 11.00
PepsiCo Inc pepsi.com $403.00 32.00 198.00 2.24 27.80 75.33 $0.98 $1.00 $0.95 2.54 1.20 0.26 $0.95 $0.73 $0.11 5.36
AVERAGE $863.33 292.00 633.67 3.66 18.19 51.22 1.34 1.31 1.39 2.03 0.74 0.20 1.57 0.54 0.19 7.16
Computer Hardware Lenovo Group Ltd lenovo.com $32,800.00 3962 42100 5.43 21.13 87.69 $1.80 $1.65 $1.79 2.77 1.65 0.30 $4.32 $2.31 $0.41 11.99
Hewlett-Packard Co hp.com $769,000.00 92707 468000 3.95 4.93 17.22 $3.41 $3.44 $3.34 1.10 0.48 0.11 $3.95 $1.65 $0.39 11.54
Acer Inc acer.com $45,000.00 6083 42500 5.69 8.76 32.96 $2.06 $2.02 $2.07 3.22 2.51 0.22 $7.42 $6.26 $0.39 12.95
Asustek Computer Inc asus.com $5,730.00 19083 52000 7.21 9.55 35.93 $1.66 $1.53 $1.58 2.00 1.06 0.21 $3.76 $1.95 $0.39 13.53
Apple Inc apple.com $277,000.00 46923 781000 3.58 47.77 157.47 $1.83 $1.78 $1.78 4.36 2.71 0.58 $4.98 $2.89 $0.65 8.79
AVERAGE $225,906.00 33751.60 277120.00 5.17 18.43 66.25 $2.15 $2.08 $2.11 2.69 1.68 0.28 $4.89 $3.01 $0.45 11.76
Department Stores Macy's Inc macys.com $2,330,000.00 678336 3400000 6.50 11.15 22.74 $0.98 $0.96 $1.03 2.19 1.11 0.32 $1.84 $0.78 $0.27 14.63
Sears Holdings Corp sears.com $2,780,000.00 738496 2960000 6.86 9.71 20.54 $1.10 $1.06 $1.14 2.26 1.17 0.29 $2.35 $1.02 $0.29 15.02
Kohl's Corp kohls.com $2,820,000.00 910274 3550000 6.70 9.59 19.36 $0.92 $0.93 $1.01 2.21 1.17 0.31 $1.80 $0.79 $0.24 15.02
Nordstrom Inc nordstrom.com $912,000.00 289836 839000 8.07 13.17 30.13 $0.99 $0.98 $1.05 2.54 1.40 0.38 $2.13 $0.80 $0.29 14.38
JC Penny Co Inc jcpenney.com $2,180,000.00 573597 3540000 7.51 10.51 20.32 $0.98 $0.97 $1.05 2.41 1.28 0.32 $1.96 $0.84 $0.27 15.53
AVERAGE $2,204,400.00 638107.80 2857800.00 7.13 10.83 22.62 $0.99 $0.98 $1.05 2.32 1.23 0.32 $2.02 $0.85 $0.27 14.92
IT Services International Business Machines ibm.com $1,660,000.00 126747 385000 5.91 3.66 12.69 $6.95 $7.29 $6.91 1.08 0.42 0.10 $7.39 $3.04 $0.91 12.94
Hewlett-Packard Co hp.com $769,000.00 92707 468000 3.95 4.93 17.22 $3.41 $3.44 $3.34 1.10 0.48 0.11 $3.95 $1.65 $0.39 11.54
Accenture PLC accenture.com $523,000.00 24619 102000 3.77 6.16 20.59 $6.88 $7.22 $7.00 1.30 0.50 0.10 $8.18 $3.33 $0.91 11.85
Cap Gemini SA capgemini.com $147,000.00 12403 23600 8.22 2.84 12.48 $8.08 $8.46 $7.79 1.18 0.42 0.09 $9.01 $3.62 $1.03 13.27
Computer Sciences Corp csc.com $4,950.00 748 1900 7.33 2.86 9.19 $2.70 $3.40 $2.99 1.96 0.52 0.08 $3.98 $1.49 $0.35 12.98
AVERAGE $620,790.00 51444.80 196100.00 5.84 4.09 14.43 $5.60 $5.96 $5.61 1.32 0.47 0.10 $6.50 $2.63 $0.72 12.52   
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Table A-5 Average performance across all numeric variables from spyfu.com files (cont’d) 
INDUSTRY COMPANY NAME URL MONTHLY BUDGET # OF KW PAID CLKS POSITION LOCAL SEARCH GLOBAL SEARCH BROAD CPC PHRASE CPC EXACT CPC BROAD CLKS/DAY PHRASE CLKS/DAY EXACT CLKS/DAY BROAD $/DAY PHRASE $/DAY EXACT $/DAY ADVERTISERS
Internet Media Google Inc google.com $7,790,000.00 979223 5070000 6.05 23.18 99.06 $3.17 $3.23 $3.19 1.54 0.63 0.14 $4.62 $1.76 $0.42 12.79
Facebook Inc facebook.com $638,000.00 10706 323000 7.03 321.58 1735.63 $2.55 $2.59 $2.63 3.25 1.21 0.23 $6.42 $2.39 $0.48 13.06
Yahoo! Inc yahoo.com $1,100,000.00 1072510 889000 8.76 7.32 18.17 $1.30 $1.26 $1.31 1.30 0.41 0.18 $1.31 $0.43 $0.19 14.28
Groupon Inc groupon.com $1,560,000.00 393133 829000 8.10 9.02 16.28 $2.08 $2.13 $2.24 1.91 0.70 0.22 $3.93 $1.31 $0.42 13.71
AVERAGE $2,772,000.00 613893.00 1777750.00 7.49 90.27 467.28 $2.27 $2.30 $2.34 2.00 0.74 0.19 $4.07 $1.47 $0.38 13.46
Life Insurance Prudential Financial Inc prudential.com $562,000.00 21766 68300 9.01 4.03 8.28 $6.18 $6.88 $7.30 1.45 0.56 0.10 $12.94 $5.71 $1.02 16.50
AXA SA axa.com $121,000.00 9655 7900 8.47 8.79 15.54 $8.66 $9.94 $10.64 1.67 0.81 0.17 $11.66 $5.34 $1.51 17.22
Metlife Inc metlife.com $2,180,000.00 261870 3640000 6.55 0.75 1.85 $1.89 $2.18 $2.26 0.19 0.09 0.02 $2.72 $1.50 $0.24 20.27
UnitedHealth Group unitedhealthgroup.com $29,100.00 3623 13100 5.68 7.00 11.51 $2.89 $2.95 $2.89 1.34 0.55 0.15 $3.56 $1.20 $0.36 12.37
AVERAGE $723,025.00 74228.50 932325.00 7.43 5.14 9.30 $4.91 $5.48 $5.77 1.16 0.50 0.11 $7.72 $3.44 $0.78 16.59
Lodging Accor SA novotel.com $17,600.00 4063 3900 9.16 3.34 20.41 $2.37 $2.31 $2.32 1.68 0.51 0.14 $7.09 $2.25 $0.54 16.70
Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc hilton.com $486,000.00 171226 593000 4.87 7.43 13.06 $1.80 $1.66 $1.78 1.02 0.30 0.16 $1.77 $0.48 $0.30 12.44
InterContinental Hotels Group intercontinental.com $68,200.00 24552 29400 8.05 4.66 14.94 $2.45 $2.19 $2.33 1.00 0.29 0.13 $2.55 $0.74 $0.33 15.97
Marriot International Inc/DE marriott.com $245,000.00 68792 247000 6.93 12.71 20.41 $1.89 $1.93 $2.09 2.06 0.75 0.30 $3.48 $1.06 $0.50 13.89
Wyndham Worldwide Corp wyndham.com $12,500.00 3321 6530 5.29 16.23 21.46 $1.75 $1.73 $1.91 2.88 0.75 0.35 $6.52 $1.61 $0.68 11.52
AVERAGE $165,860.00 54390.80 175966.00 6.86 8.87 18.05 $2.05 $1.96 $2.09 1.73 0.52 0.22 $4.28 $1.23 $0.47 14.10
Mass Merchants Wal-Mart Stores Inc walmart.com $5,440,000.00 1872147 5580000 6.47 15.65 38.49 $1.10 $1.06 $1.11 2.82 1.55 0.41 $2.97 $1.31 $0.35 12.79
Costco Wholesale Corp costco.com $525.00 407 934 5.45 18.22 26.31 $3.00 $3.36 $3.79 3.95 1.42 0.35 $20.49 $8.43 $2.16 10.83
Target Corp target.com $5,160,000.00 2111723 5540000 6.73 13.89 34.04 $1.01 $0.97 $1.03 3.24 1.67 0.44 $2.97 $1.23 $0.35 13.29
Dollar General Corp dollargeneral.com $20,200.00 4259 16700 7.29 19.18 27.27 $1.09 $1.07 $1.15 3.00 1.45 0.41 $2.38 $1.04 $0.36 15.05
Sears Holdings Corp sears.com $2,780,000.00 738496 2960000 6.81 10.72 22.62 $1.12 $1.07 $1.15 2.54 1.32 0.31 $2.68 $1.16 $0.32 15.05
AVERAGE $2,680,145.00 945406.40 2819526.80 6.55 15.53 29.75 $1.46 $1.51 $1.65 3.11 1.48 0.38 $6.30 $2.63 $0.71 13.40
Restaurants Starbucks Corp starbucks.com $41,400.00 8047 49000 5.47 28.90 44.17 $1.42 $1.41 $1.54 2.06 1.01 0.38 $2.56 $0.92 $0.33 12.28
McDonald's Corp mcdonalds.com $11,500.00 4169 23800 3.59 58.29 138.92 $1.35 $1.23 $1.28 2.56 1.35 0.35 $4.48 $1.76 $0.34 9.09
Darden Restaurants Inc olivegarden.com $19,700.00 3172 47100 4.62 50.84 66.07 $1.21 $1.32 $1.38 4.07 2.40 0.54 $4.76 $1.57 $0.33 8.75
Bloomin' Brands Inc outback.com $29,200.00 2409 16000 3.35 50.59 62.42 $1.36 $1.42 $1.48 4.20 5.03 0.71 $5.52 $4.82 $0.35 8.09
Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc chipotle.com $46,400.00 6151 38400 5.39 21.43 29.40 $1.95 $1.86 $1.91 2.46 1.05 0.17 $3.20 $1.08 $0.22 11.17
AVERAGE $29,640.00 4789.60 34860.00 4.48 42.01 68.19 $1.46 $1.45 $1.52 3.07 2.17 0.43 $4.10 $2.03 $0.31 9.88
Retail Discretionary Home Depot Inc/The homedepot.com $3,010,000.00 406760 2520000 5.48 8.60 14.54 $1.59 $1.67 $1.82 2.31 1.06 0.25 $4.05 $1.62 $0.38 14.17
Amazon.com amazon.com $14,500,000.00 4972407 24400000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Lowe's Cos Inc lowes.com $3,290,000.00 583339 3150000 5.63 7.89 14.57 $1.40 $1.46 $1.58 2.25 1.04 0.25 $3.27 $1.28 $0.35 14.11
Best Buy Co Inc bestbuy.com $1,140,000.00 306290 1780000 4.40 13.14 38.31 $1.21 $1.16 $1.18 1.52 0.80 0.24 $1.75 $0.74 $0.22 11.66
TJX Cos Inc/The tjx.com $213,000.00 64951 295000 7.83 14.07 26.15 $0.88 $0.90 $0.96 3.29 1.70 0.44 $2.17 $0.79 $0.30 15.51
AVERAGE $4,430,600.00 1266749.40 6429000.00 5.83 10.92 23.40 $1.27 $1.30 $1.38 2.34 1.15 0.30 $2.81 $1.11 $0.31 13.86
Software Microsoft Corp microsoft.com $2,070,000.00 193835 1200000 5.59 8.84 47.13 $5.88 $5.98 $5.67 1.49 0.71 0.13 $6.60 $2.59 $0.66 12.78
Internationa Business Machines ibm.com $1,660,000.00 126747 385000 5.91 3.66 12.69 $6.95 $7.29 $6.91 1.08 0.42 0.10 $7.39 $3.04 $0.91 12.94
Oracle Group oracle.com $438,000.00 28724 159000 6.50 5.86 21.60 $7.00 $7.44 $7.29 1.70 0.72 0.12 $12.71 $5.52 $1.24 12.85
SAP SE sap.com $517,000.00 30169 93000 5.73 3.76 14.89 $7.38 $7.71 $7.22 1.25 0.47 0.09 $9.08 $3.50 $0.87 13.53
Symantec Corp symantec.com $309,000.00 18074 60100 6.05 2.85 10.18 $8.60 $9.29 $9.11 0.98 0.43 0.08 $7.65 $3.87 $0.89 13.43
AVERAGE $998,800.00 79509.80 379420.00 5.96 4.99 21.30 $7.16 $7.54 $7.24 1.30 0.55 0.10 $8.69 $3.70 $0.91 13.11
Telecom Carriers AT&T Inc att.com $2,170,000.00 152103 947000 4.62 13.06 45.62 $4.62 $4.97 $4.94 1.91 0.84 0.22 $8.21 $3.13 $0.79 12.27
Verizon Communications Inc verizonwireless.com $567,000.00 65504 346000 5.35 26.85 69.76 $3.18 $3.32 $3.36 2.41 1.36 0.33 $6.47 $3.27 $0.63 12.57
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Company ntt.com $32,400.00 2952 6490 6.56 6.03 38.68 $6.45 $6.82 $6.13 1.01 0.41 0.09 $8.66 $4.15 $1.13 12.06
Deutshe Telekom AG t-mobile.com $314,000.00 19248 272000 3.76 62.34 202.41 $2.16 $2.22 $2.19 3.11 2.38 0.86 $5.54 $2.48 $2.28 10.05
Vodafone vodaphone.com $11,700.00 244 2900 6.91 6.56 23.03 $17.05 $23.21 $23.50 4.49 1.54 0.32 $59.61 $19.96 $5.52 18.57
AVERAGE $619,020.00 48010.20 314878.00 5.44 22.97 75.90 $6.69 $8.11 $8.02 2.59 1.31 0.37 $17.70 $6.60 $2.07 13.10
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Figure A-1 Google’s search results for the term “flight to new zealand” 
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Figure A-2 Google’s search results for the term “flight to niagara falls ontario” 
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Figure A-3 Budget setting example in an AdWords account 
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Figure A-4 The simulation model in Arena 
P a g e  | 118 
 
Appendix B Statistical Results 
Table B-1 Lenovo’s paired t-test results 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 
COST 563.773617 3000 208.1185846 3.7997081 
BASELINE 3162.490418 3000 223.7141683 4.0844432 
Pair 2 
VOLUME 937.052155 3000 237.0204206 4.3273810 
BASELINE 3162.490418 3000 223.7141683 4.0844432 
Pair 3 
CLICKS 1774.786289 3000 293.2919086 5.3547531 
BASELINE 3162.490418 3000 223.7141683 4.0844432 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 COST - BASELINE -2598.7168018 177.4829420 3.2403804 -2605.0703948 -2592.3632088 -801.979 2999 .000 
Pair 2 VOLUME  - BASELINE -2225.4382630 126.1951245 2.3039972 -2229.9558377 -2220.9206882 -965.903 2999 .000 
Pair 3 CLICKS - BASELINE -1387.7041290 295.6303537 5.3974471 -1398.2872021 -1377.1210558 -257.104 2999 .000 
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Table B-2 Macy’s paired t-test results 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 
COST 126.654855 3000 57.9899389 1.0587466 
BASELINE 1215.555309 3000 60.5844881 1.1061164 
Pair 2 
VOLUME 139.938483 3000 51.0900424 .9327723 
BASELINE 1215.555309 3000 60.5844881 1.1061164 
Pair 3 
CLCIKS 185.596566 3000 60.0531336 1.0964152 
BASELINE 1215.555309 3000 60.5844881 1.1061164 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 COST - BASELINE -1088.9004532 104.6036251 1.9097922 -1092.6450884 -1085.1558181 -570.167 2999 .000 
Pair 2 VOLUME  - BASELINE -1075.6168258 89.4299984 1.6327609 -1078.8182704 -1072.4153811 -658.772 2999 .000 
Pair 3 CLCIKS - BASELINE -1029.9587427 63.5116918 1.1595595 -1032.2323552 -1027.6851301 -888.233 2999 .000 
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Table B-3 Prudential’s paired t-test results 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 
COST 2987.809144 3000 395.6768926 7.2240387 
BASELINE 5149.745939 3000 371.4453078 6.7816325 
Pair 2 
VOLUME 3225.030230 3000 394.8856517 7.2095926 
BASELINE 5149.745939 3000 371.4453078 6.7816325 
Pair 3 
CLCIKS 3638.497594 3000 491.4641984 8.9728676 
BASELINE 5149.745939 3000 371.4453078 6.7816325 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 COST - BASELINE -2161.9367959 736.3978223 13.4447233 -2188.2986086 -2135.5749832 -160.802 2999 .000 
Pair 2 VOLUME  - BASELINE -1924.7157099 746.9800687 13.6379278 -1951.4563493 -1897.9750704 -141.130 2999 .000 
Pair 3 CLCIKS - BASELINE -1511.2483452 685.8556340 12.5219534 -1535.8008320 -1486.6958585 -120.688 2999 .000 
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Table B-4 United Continental Holdings’ paired t-test results 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 
COST 166.201656 3000 87.5421271 1.5982933 
BASELINE 2099.244377 3000 99.6758427 1.8198236 
Pair 2 
VOLUME 247.340077 3000 104.4977689 1.9078595 
BASELINE 2099.244377 3000 99.6758427 1.8198236 
Pair 3 
CLCIKS 170.546420 3000 81.0068616 1.4789762 
BASELINE 2099.244377 3000 99.6758427 1.8198236 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 COST - BASELINE -1933.0427210 90.7584468 1.6570150 -1936.2917219 -1929.7937201 -1166.581 2999 .000 
Pair 2 VOLUME  - BASELINE -1851.9043002 56.0287747 1.0229408 -1853.9100368 -1849.8985636 -1810.373 2999 .000 
Pair 3 CLCIKS - BASELINE -1928.6979573 124.1169367 2.2660549 -1933.1411364 -1924.2547781 -851.126 2999 .000 
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Table B-5 Lenovo’s additional paired t-test results 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 
COST 563.773617 3000 208.1185846 3.7997081 
VOLUME 937.052155 3000 237.0204206 4.3273810 
Pair 2 
COST 563.773617 3000 208.1185846 3.7997081 
CLICKS 1774.786289 3000 293.2919086 5.3547531 
Pair 3 
VOLUME 937.052155 3000 237.0204206 4.3273810 
CLICKS 1774.786289 3000 293.2919086 5.3547531 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 COST - VOLUME -373.2785388 155.2008833 2.8335675 -378.8344714 -367.7226063 -131.734 2999 .000 
Pair 2 COST - CLICKS -1211.0126728 279.9949621 5.1119852 -1221.0360250 -1200.9893206 -236.897 2999 .000 
Pair 3 VOLUME  - CLICKS -837.7341340 270.0263269 4.9299837 -847.4006257 -828.0676423 -169.926 2999 .000 
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Table B-6 Macy’s additional paired t-test results 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 
COST 126.654855 3000 57.9899389 1.0587466 
VOLUME 139.938483 3000 51.0900424 .9327723 
Pair 2 
COST 126.654855 3000 57.9899389 1.0587466 
CLICKS 185.596566 3000 60.0531336 1.0964152 
Pair 3 
VOLUME 139.938483 3000 51.0900424 .9327723 
CLICKS 185.596566 3000 60.0531336 1.0964152 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 COST - VOLUME -13.2836275 40.4637072 .7387628 -14.7321606 -11.8350943 -17.981 2999 .000 
Pair 2 COST - CLICKS -58.9417106 79.3846982 1.4493597 -61.7835502 -56.0998709 -40.667 2999 .000 
Pair 3 VOLUME  - CLICKS -45.6580831 63.7865051 1.1645769 -47.9415335 -43.3746327 -39.206 2999 .000 
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Table B-7 Prudential’s additional paired t-test results 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 
COST 2987.809144 3000 395.6768926 7.2240387 
VOLUME 3225.030230 3000 394.8856517 7.2095926 
Pair 2 
COST 2987.809144 3000 395.6768926 7.2240387 
CLICKS 3638.497594 3000 491.4641984 8.9728676 
Pair 3 
VOLUME 3225.030230 3000 394.8856517 7.2095926 
CLICKS 3638.497594 3000 491.4641984 8.9728676 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 COST - VOLUME -237.2210860 134.3011545 2.4519924 -242.0288432 -232.4133289 -96.746 2999 .000 
Pair 2 COST - CLICKS -650.6884507 512.5036162 9.3569930 -669.0352245 -632.3416768 -69.540 2999 .000 
Pair 3 VOLUME  - CLICKS -413.4673646 502.3796662 9.1721559 -431.4517180 -395.4830112 -45.079 2999 .000 
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Table B-8 United Continental Holdings’ additional paired t-test results 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 
COST 166.201656 3000 87.5421271 1.5982933 
VOLUME 247.340077 3000 104.4977689 1.9078595 
Pair 2 
COST 166.201656 3000 87.5421271 1.5982933 
CLICKS 170.546420 3000 81.0068616 1.4789762 
Pair 3 
VOLUME 247.340077 3000 104.4977689 1.9078595 
CLICKS 170.546420 3000 81.0068616 1.4789762 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 COST - VOLUME -81.1384208 81.6987882 1.4916090 -84.0631010 -78.2137406 -54.397 2999 .000 
Pair 2 COST - CLICKS -4.3447638 65.1609333 1.1896704 -6.6774164 -2.0121111 -3.652 2999 .000 
Pair 3 VOLUME  - CLICKS 76.7936571 119.0145772 2.1728990 72.5331339 81.0541802 35.342 2999 .000 
 
